External border control and asylum management as EU common goods : a budgetary perspective by D'ALFONSO, Alessandro
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2019/05 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
 
External border control and asylum management as EU 
common goods. A budgetary perspective 
 
Alessandro D´Alfonso 
  
  
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
 
 
External border control and asylum management as EU 
common goods. A budgetary perspective 
  
 
Alessandro D´Alfonso 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2019/05 
 
  
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Alessandro D´Alfonso, 2019 
Manuscript completed in July 2018 
Printed in Italy, February 2019 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and currently directed by 
Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the 
major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies and Europe’s place 
in 21st century global politics. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes, 
projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The 
research agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, 
reflecting the changing agenda of European integration, the expanding membership of the 
European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world. 
For more information: http://eui.eu/rscas 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s). Furthermore, 
the views expressed in this publication represent a personal opinion and should not be taken to 
represent an official position of the European Union or the European Parliament.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Alessandro D’ALFONSO is a policy analyst at the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) in Brussels. He is 
the author of many publications on EU budgetary affairs. In 2017-2018, he was EU Fellow at the European University 
Institute (EUI). As a Visiting Professor, he has taught on the EUPADRA Master on parliamentary procedures and 
legislative drafting at LUISS Guido Carli University (Rome). Before joining the European Parliament, he held different 
posts at the European Commission and previously worked as a manager in the private sector. He has written this paper in 
a personal capacity. 
  
Abstract 
The removal of internal border controls across most of the European Union (EU) has increased the 
interdependencies between the Member States, triggering the emergence of many different EU common 
goods. In the fields of external border controls, asylum and migration, Article 80 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) implicitly recognizes the existence of such common goods 
and the challenges related to their effective provision, by establishing solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility between the Member States as governing principle for relevant common policies. An 
analysis of negotiations on the EU´s Multiannual Financial Frameworks since 1993 and of data on 
budgetary implementation since 2000 show that pooling of financial resources at EU level and the 
establishment of common structures have advanced slowly, despite efforts from the European 
Parliament and the European Commission to gain momentum. Both specific features of the EU 
budgetary provisions and institutional characteristics of these sensitive policy areas have contributed to 
the slow progress. Against this backdrop, the 2015-2016 surge in arrivals of asylum-seekers has led to 
an emergency-driven increase in joint financial efforts, which nevertheless remain limited as compared 
to national expenditure in the policy areas. Scattered data suggest that the latter is unevenly distributed 
across the Union. These questions acquire renewed salience in the context of the negotiations on the 
post-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework. While pooling of financial resources at EU level cannot 
alone ensure fair sharing of responsibility, a series of possible developments in this domain have the 
potential to strengthen the contribution of the EU budget to the implementation of the principle that is 
to govern the common policies on external borders, asylum and migration according to the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
Keywords 
EU budget, asylum, external borders, principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, EU 
common goods. 
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1. Introduction* 
Citizens regularly value free movement of people, goods and services within the European Union (EU) 
among the most positive and beneficial results of the EU.1 The removal of internal border controls for 
persons across most of the EU, which has played a major role in shaping free movement as we know it 
today, has increased interdependencies between Member States, making the case for greater coherence 
and triggering strengthened cooperation in many different policy areas.  
Among other domains, the gradual creation of an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice has involved 
the development of common policies on external border controls, asylum and migration. EU integration 
in these domains, which are closely related to core state powers, has mainly been regulatory, since it has 
relied on the development of common rules to be implemented by national authorities (Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs 2018).2  
While having each its specific features, all these policy areas have a significant operational 
dimension. The relevant regulatory frameworks determine the Member State in charge of 
implementation and establish specific obligations with operational implications for them. In particular, 
these characteristics apply to external border controls through the Schengen acquis and to asylum 
through the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which includes the Dublin Regulation 
assigning the responsibility for processing an asylum request mainly to the first country of entry into the 
EU.3  
The Schengen and Dublin systems, which are closely interrelated, were originally developed in the 
1980s and the 1990s in a completely different geopolitical situation. Various events culminating in the 
surge in arrivals of asylum-seekers in 2015 have gradually exposed the original asymmetry of the 
systems, which are frequently deemed to assign a disproportionate responsibility to Member States 
neighbouring non‐EU countries, notably those on the EU's southern and eastern borders (De Somer 
2018).4 
This paper looks at the contribution that pooling budgetary resources at EU level can give in 
addressing this asymmetry, with a view to ensuring an appropriate provision of the various common 
goods that the policy areas imply. The principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, which is 
to govern the EU policies on borders, asylum and migration according to the Treaty of Lisbon, is 
examined, including its relationship with the concept of common goods (Chapter 2). The analysis 
focuses on how the policy-specific allocations have developed in the EU budgetary system over time, 
presenting relevant outcomes in the negotiations for multiannual financial frameworks since 1993 and 
actual budgetary implementation during the 2000-2016 period (Chapter 3). After an overview of the role 
                                                     
* The author would like to express his deep gratitude to Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies (RSCAS), as well as the entire community of the RSCAS  and of the Migration Policy Centre (MPC), for the 
encouragement and support he has received during his fellowship at the RSCAS of the European University Institute (EUI). 
In addition, he would like to thank officials from the European Commission, the European Parliament, the International 
Monetary Fund, the Netherlands Court of Audit and the US Congressional Research Service, as well as those participating 
in the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation (ECPRD),who provided much valued replies to his 
questions during the research that has led to this paper. Likewise, his appreciation goes to the participants in the seminar 
organised by the RSCAS on 20 June 2018, where the preliminary results of the paper were presented. 
1 European Commission, Public opinion in the European Union: Standard Eurobarometer 89 (Spring 2018), First results, 
June 2018. 
2 P. Genschel and M. Jachtenfuchs, From Market Integration to Core State Powers: The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis 
and Integration Theory, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2018, Volume 56, Number 1, pp. 178–196. 
3 In the field of legal migration, the EU framework has a more limited role. For example, Member States autonomously 
determine volumes of admissions of third-country nationals. 
4 M. De Somer, Dublin and Schengen: A tale of two cities, European Policy Centre, Discussion Paper, 15 June 2018. 
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that other EU budgetary instruments, including those for external action, can play in the policy areas 
(Chapter 4), the analysis moves to relevant expenditure at Member State level, introducing the 
significant challenges that quantifying these allocations poses as well as some tentative estimates that 
have been produced in the wake of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis (Chapter 5). The final part examines 
possible developments in post-2020 EU budgets based on the European Commission´s proposals for the 
next Multiannual Financial Framework (Chapter 6), considering options that could increase the 
contribution of EU budgetary resources to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in 
the fields of asylum and external border control (Chapter 7).  
2. Solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility: provision of EU common goods 
This Chapter examines the rationale and the legal foundations behind the pooling of financial resources 
for asylum management and external border control at EU level, which is one of the possible forms of 
responsibility-sharing that EU Member States have in these domains. The first section looks at how, 
over time, these policy areas have seen the emergence of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, which was eventually enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon. Putting the principle in the 
broader context of solidarity in the EU framework, the second section focuses on its practical 
implications and explores the links of the principle to the provision of common goods in economic 
theory.  
2.1 The origins of Article 80 TFEU and its use in EU budgetary instruments 
Concepts relating to solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities have been debated and associated with 
the policy area of asylum management since early stages of cooperation at EU level. Their use has 
progressively been extended to the interrelated policy areas of border control and migration. 
This approach appears to derive from and build on the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status 
of refugees, which established that addressing refugee issues requires international cooperation and 
burden sharing. Commentaries consider that international cooperation clearly includes not only the field 
of protection of refugees, but also that of assistance to States that are faced with significant challenges 
in the domain.5 
Initial examples of references to the concept at EU level include the 1995 resolution on burden-
sharing with regard to the admission and residence of displaced persons on a temporary basis that the 
Council adopted in the wake of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.6 The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam 
listed a number of measures that the Council had to adopt in the field of asylum and international 
protection within five years of the entry into force of the Treaty itself. Among others, these concerned 
“measures on refugees and displaced persons […] promoting a balance of effort between Member States 
in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons”.7 In October 
1999, the European Council concluded that the European Commission should explore the opportunity 
of creating a financial reserve to be made available in the event of mass influx of refugees for temporary 
protection.8  
                                                     
5 The Refugee Convention, 1951: The travaux preparatoires analysed with a commentary by Dr Paul Weis, International 
Documents Series, Centre for International Law, University of Cambridge, 1990. 
6 Council Resolution of 25 September 1995 on burden-sharing with regard to the admission and residence of displaced 
persons on a temporary basis, OJ C 262, 7 October 1995, pp. 1-3. 
7 Article 63(2)(b) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (Amsterdam consolidated version). Official Journal 
C 340 , 10 November 1997, pp. 173-306. 
8 See Tampere conclusions. 
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In 2002, the Working Group of the European Convention devoted to Freedom, Security and Justice 
recommended that the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial 
implications, between the Member States, be embedded in the Treaty and be applied as a general 
principle to the EU asylum policy and to the closely related fields of immigration and border control. In 
addition, the recommendation included the creation of a specific legal basis for the adoption of the 
measures necessary to implement the principle.9 
Two years later, the European Council approved the Hague Programme on freedom, security and 
justice in the EU, concluding that the second phase of the common policy on asylum, migration and 
borders should be based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. Financial implications were 
again expressly mentioned in this context alongside technical cooperation.10 
In 2007, the Treaty of Lisbon eventually enshrined solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility as a 
general principle for the policy areas covered by Part Three, Title V, Chapter 2 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). All the policy areas in question, namely border control, 
asylum and immigration, are interrelated and highly relevant to the principle of free movement of 
persons within the EU. Article 80 TFEU reads: 
The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between 
the Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall 
contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle. 
At the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the European Commission mentioned 
Article 80 TFEU for the first time as a joint legal basis (together with Article 78 TFEU) in a document 
outlining the impact of the new Treaty on ongoing legislative procedures.11 The legislative procedure in 
question, a proposal for a Decision to modify the existing European Refugee Fund (ERF), had budgetary 
implications.  
However, the Council of the European Union opposed the idea of Article 80 TFEU as a joint legal 
basis and proposed mentioning it in the recitals. The Commission accepted the solution, but at the 
request of the European Parliament issued a declaration that the compromise reached in 2012 was 
without prejudice to the possible use of Article 80 TFEU as a joint legal basis in the future.12 
The differing views of EU institutions on the matter were again apparent during the negotiations on 
the following generation of EU budgetary instruments, which included the 2014-2020 Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF). The Council of the European Union was against the use of 
Article 80 TFEU as a joint legal basis, while the European Parliament supported it. With a view to 
preventing the implementation of the Fund from being delayed, the European Parliament eventually 
decided to adopt the AMIF Regulation on the legal basis backed by the Council, but reiterated its view 
in a statement attached to the legislative resolution. The statement stressed the importance of the 
solidarity principle in Article 80 TFEU, and showed the intention to support the development of tools 
under this legal basis in the future. Along similar lines, the European Commission noted that the 
adoption of the Regulation was without prejudice to the possible use of Article 80 TFEU.13 
                                                     
9 Working Group X "Freedom, Security and Justice", European Convention, Final report, CONV 426/02, 2 December 2002. 
10 The Hague Programme : strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union (approved by the European 
Council on 5 November 2004), 16054/04, JAI 559, p. 8. 
11 European Commission, Consequences of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon for ongoing interinstitutional decision-
making procedures, COM (2009) 665 final, 2 December 2009, Annex IV, p. 61. 
12 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament concerning the position of the Council, COM (2012) 
110 final, 9 March 2012; and Decision No 281/2012/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 March 2012. 
13 European Parliament, Legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation establishing the Asylum and Migration Fund, 
P7_TA(2014)0237, 13 March 2014. 
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The parallel negotiations on the Borders and Visa component of the 2014-2020 Internal Security 
Fund (ISF) had a similar result, since the principle is mentioned in the recitals and enhancing solidarity 
and responsibility-sharing between the Member States is one of the specific objectives of the instrument 
(as in the case of the AMIF Regulation). However, no statement on Article 80 TFEU as a joint legal 
basis is attached to the resolution, suggesting that the relevant discussion has been less prominent with 
regard to the policy area of external border management. 
2.2 Scope and implications of solidarity in the EU legal framework in general and in Article 80 
TFEU in particular 
Being included in the Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950, the value of solidarity has accompanied the 
process of European integration since its very beginning. The use of the term in the EU context has 
grown over time, and has multiple dimensions. Currently, the Treaty of Lisbon refers to solidarity at 
least once in eleven different articles,14 some of which are general in scope, while others are specific to 
given policy areas such as the common foreign and security policy, energy, and the area of freedom 
security and justice. Solidarity may concern relations between citizens, states or generations. 
In the absence of a definition of solidarity in the EU legal framework, differing views have emerged 
among scholars concerning its scope and enforceability. Positions showing scepticism towards the 
practical implications of the concept, notably when looking at the formulation of Article 80 TFEU, are 
exemplified by Noll (2016). It is argued that, while being to some extent part of a binding text, the term 
solidarity lacks sufficient legal precision to create concrete obligations for Member States.15 
However, Vanheule et al. (2011) note that the role played by solidarity in the EU framework varies 
depending on the issue at stake and may involve different forms of cooperation.16 Analysing the rationale 
behind the inclusion of solidarity in specific EU legal provisions as well as relevant EU case law, Küçük 
(2016) concludes that the concept of solidarity has normative consequences mainly when it is 
underpinned by self-interest and reciprocal return. In other words, solidarity implies strict legally 
binding obligations when it is instrumental in the provision of a common good.17 
From a political theory perspective, Sangiovanni (2013) draws similar conclusions on the 
operationalisation of the concept of solidarity in the EU framework. Solidarity in the EU is mainly based 
on reciprocity: Member States enhance their capacity to respond to transnational challenges by means 
of EU integration, which produces common goods, but may imply costs that are unevenly distributed. 
In this sense, solidarity is to be seen as a way through which Member States insure each other for an 
uneven distribution of the costs associated with a given project: EU structural and cohesion funds are 
provided as an example of such an insurance-mechanism in the budgetary field to counterbalance the 
pressure of market integration.18  
The specific formulation of solidarity enshrined in Article 80 TFEU appears to match these features. 
The principle underpinning the policy areas of border control, asylum management and migration is not 
                                                     
14 Articles 2, 3, 21 24, 31 and 32 of The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Articles 67, 80, 122, 194, 222 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
15 G. Noll, Failure by Design? On the Constitution of EU Solidarity, in: Searching for Solidarity in EU Asylum and Border 
Policies, Odysseus Network´s First Annual Policy Conference, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 26-27 February 2016, pp. 3-
4.  
16 D. Vanheule, J. van Selm and C. Boswell, The Implementation of Article 80 TFEU on the Principle of Solidarity and Fair 
Sharing of Responsibility, including its Financial Implications, between the Member States in the Field of Border Checks, 
Asylum and Immigration, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2011, pp. 27-31. 
17 E. Küçük, Solidarity in EU Law: An Elusive Political Statement or a Legal Principle with Substance?, in: Maastricht Journal 
of European and Comparative Law Volume: 23, Issue 6, 2016. 
18 A. Sangiovanni, Solidarity in the European Union, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33, 2013. 
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only of solidarity, but of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility. Being the only recurrence in the 
Treaty of Lisbon where an explicit reference to fair sharing of responsibility accompanies solidarity, 
Article 80 TFEU suggests that the characteristics of the policy areas at stake, which often imply a 
significant operational dimension,19 are such that responsibility may be unevenly distributed between 
Member States and thus require measures to address the imbalance. In this sense, the second part of 
Article 80 TFEU sets that: ´Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall 
contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle´. Along similar lines, Tsourdi (2017) 
defines the principle enshrined in Article 80 TFEU as ´solidarity plus´.20  
From this perspective, Article 80 TFEU is linked to the concepts of transnational collective and 
public goods. The latter are goods or services that being completely or to some extent non-excludable 
and non-rival in consumption21 require coordinated efforts of public authorities or a supranational 
mechanism to ensure their effective provision.  
In addition to the degree of rivalry and excludability of its benefits, a third dimension that has an 
impact on the most suitable way to address a given public good is the technology through which public 
supply is aggregated. For example, based on the nature of the public (or nearly public) good at stake, 
the level of its provision may correspond to the sum of the efforts of all the stakeholders (leading to 
possible phenomena of free riding) or to the lowest effort produced by an individual stakeholder (´the 
weakest link´), determining a suboptimal supply of the good in the absence of an effective cooperation 
mechanism.22  
Many scholars agree that the provision of asylum is to be seen as an international public good23 or a 
regional public good.24 States complying with international obligations stemming from the Geneva 
Convention and taking care of refugees do contribute to stability, by reducing the pressure on the 
international community or at least on their neighbours. External border control as part of the wider 
realm of defence is a recurrent textbook example of public good at national or federal level:25 ensuring 
security for the border regions automatically provides security to the inner regions as well.  
Migration has clear links to both asylum and borders, as analysed by the 2017 MEDAM Report, 
which underlines that the design of effective policies requires a systemic approach. For example, while 
labour migration and refugee protection are different from a conceptual and an operational standpoint, 
the absence of pathways for legal migration may push some would-be labour migrants to see the asylum 
                                                     
19 J. Monar (ed.), The institutional dimension of the European Union's area of freedom, security, and justice, College of 
Europe studies no. 11, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2010, pp. 31-32.  
20 E. Tsourdi, Solidarity at work? The prevalence of emergency driven solidarity in the administrative governance of the 
Common European Asylum System, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2017, Vol. 24(5), pp. 667–
686. 
21 Resources, goods or services are non-excludable if it is not possible to prevent a non-paying consumer from enjoying or 
consuming them. They are non-rival if they can be enjoyed or consumed by many persons at the same time and, at any 
level of production, providing them to one additional consumer triggers no additional costs. Clean air is an example of a 
resource that is both non-excludable and non-rival. For an overview of the concepts, see: R. Cornes, T. Sandler, The theory 
of externalities, public goods, and club goods, Cambridge University Press, 1986.  
22 T. Sandler, On financing global and international public goods, World Bank, Economic Policy and Prospects Group, 2001. 
The paper identifies other two aggregation technologies: ´best shot´, i.e. the largest individual contribution determines the 
amount of the public good; and ´weighted sum´, i.e. the amount of a given public good is equal to the sum of individual 
contributions, which are however weighted on the basis of the interest that individual stakeholders have in that public good.  
23 For example, see: A. Suhrke, Burden-sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National 
Action, Journal Of Refugee Studies, 4, 1998. 
24 T. Sandler, Regional public goods and international organizations, The Review of International Organizations, March 2006, 
Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 5–25. 
25 See for example the voice ´Public good´ by Sean Ingham in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
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procedure as a possibility of entering a country, blurring the differences and posing a number of 
challenges.26 
Looking at the EU context in particular, the integration process and the removal of internal border 
controls are deemed to have triggered the emergence of regional common goods connected to asylum 
and migration management, as well as external border control. Thielemann and Armstrong (2013) argue 
that the systems based on the Schengen acquis (border control and migration) and the Dublin Regulation 
(asylum and migration) produce a complex set of various collective goods, which are partly public and 
partly private.27 Analysing the EU´s southern border, Haake et al. (2013) qualify public spending on its 
enforcement as a public good.28 In a study mapping the cost of non-Europe, van Ballegooij (2016) 
identifies a genuine area of freedom, security and justice as an EU-wide public good ensuring free 
movement of persons ‘in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, 
asylum, immigration [...]’. This Cost of Non-Europe report concludes that the return to a fully-
functioning Schengen Area would require enhanced EU action, including reforms to foster solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States.29 
On this basis, Article 80 TFEU and its reference to fair sharing of responsibility can be seen as the 
Treaty provision designed to ensure an effective supply of the multiple EU common goods that have 
emerged further to the removal of internal border controls in the context of the Schengen acquis and the 
broader integration process.  
Along these lines, Küçük (2016) considers that Article 80 TFEU can be an effective legal tool to 
strengthen solidarity if properly used in EU secondary legislation and/or through judicial review of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).30 In 2017, the CJEU referred to Article 80 TFEU to 
interpret another Treaty provision on the common asylum policy: the opinion of the Advocate General 
read the two Articles in conjunction, considering them as a joint legal basis from which specific 
obligations concerning solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility stem for Member States.31 
Therefore, the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities enshrined in Article 80 TFEU 
refers to intra-state solidarity,32 which concerns both Member States and EU institutions.33 Sharing 
financial resources is the only practical example provided by Article 80 TFEU, in line with the 
challenges that financing collective goods usually presents.34 However, it does not exhaust the means of 
sharing responsibility (´principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial 
implications, between the Member States´).  
                                                     
26 MEDAM (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration). 2017. 2017 MEDAM Assessment Report on Asylum and 
Migration Policies in Europe, Kiel: IfW. 
27 E. Thielemann and C. Armstrong, Understanding European asylum cooperation under the Schengen/Dublin system: a 
public goods framework, European Security, 2013, 22:2, pp. 148-164. 
28 C.-J. Haake, T. Krieger and S. Minter, On the institutional design of burden sharing when financing external border 
enforcement in the EU, International Economics and Economic Policy, 2013, vol. 10, issue 4, pp. 583-612. 
29 W. van Ballegooij, The Cost of Non-Schengen: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs aspects. Cost of Non-Europe 
Report, EPRS, European Parliament, September 2016. At the time of writing, three additional Cost of Non-Europe reports 
are being drafted. They focus respectively on asylum policy, legal migration and the control of the EU's external borders.  
30 E. Küçük, op.cit. 
31 Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15 Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the European Union, EU: C:2017:631 
(Judgement) and ECLI:EU:C:2017:618 (Opinion). 
32 Article 67(2) TFEU on the general provisions applicable to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice refers not only to 
intra-state solidarity but also to fairness towards third-country nationals as a basis for the common policy on asylum, 
immigration and external border control.  
33 D. Vanheule, J. van Selm and C. Boswell, op. cit., p. 8. 
34 See for example: T. Sandler, 2001, op. cit. 
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Focusing on the Common European Asylum System, Gray (2013) identifies ´sharing people´ (i.e. 
asylum-seekers´ claims and/or refugees´ protection) and ´sharing norms´ alongside ´sharing money´, as 
possible forms of responsibility-sharing.35 In the case of external border control (but also for asylum 
management, especially since the 2015-2016 refugee crisis), a fourth category of ´sharing in-kind 
contributions´ could be added as shown, for example, by requests for pooling of non-financial resources 
(e.g. technical equipment and deployment of staff) that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
(Frontex) makes with a view to facilitating and carrying out joint operations. 
While Article 80 TFEU has not been used as a joint legal basis for relevant funding programmes to date, 
solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility is one of their specific objectives (see Section 2.1), and 
´sharing money´ is often provided as the main example of solidarity in asylum, migration and external 
border policies at EU level.36  
In addition, it is a governing principle against which the broader design of the policy areas can be 
assessed. In this respect, the current systems based on the Schengen acquis and the Dublin Regulation 
are usually deemed to create a disproportionate burden on certain Member States (´frontline Member 
States´) due to their geographic position and/or other factors.37  
Therefore, when the focus is shifted on fair-sharing of responsibility, scholars and analysts generally 
consider that an effective implementation of the principle would require as preconditions a common 
agreement on the responsibility to be shared (since Article 80 TFEU does not provide a definition of it) 
and the relative capacity of Member States in a given policy area. The latter may differ depending on 
the variables that are chosen to determine it (e.g. gross national income (GNI), population, 
unemployment rate, etc.). 38  
In addition, a compulsory mechanism to give effect to the principle is often seen as more effective 
than voluntary schemes,39 as the recurrent pledging gaps in in-kind contributions from Member States 
further to Frontex’s requests to support its operational activities appear to confirm.40 Following the 
cleavages emerged between Member States on compulsory relocation schemes, some analysts have 
supported an intermediary approach of flexible solidarity, where an increased centralisation of tasks and 
resources at EU level would be coupled with the capacity for Member States to choose the form of their 
contribution. According to this approach, Member States that are less involved in direct asylum, 
migration and border management should contribute proportionally more to these activities otherwise, 
for example financially.41  
3. Pooling of policy-specific resources for external border control and asylum 
management through the EU budget 
This Chapter focuses on the EU budget as the tool available to Member States to give effect to the 
financial dimension of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility (´sharing money´), 
                                                     
35 H. Gray, Surveying the Foundations: Article 80 TFEU and the Common European Asylum System’, Liverpool Law 
Review, 2013, 34, pp. 175-193. 
36 See for example: K. Hailbronner and D. Thym (ed.), EU Immigration and Asylum Law: A Commentary, Second edition, 
C.H. Beck –Hart – Nomos, 2016, p. 1045; and H. Gray, op. cit.  
37 E. Thielemann and C. Armstrong, 2013, op. cit. 
38 See for example: E. Thielemann, R. Williams and C. Boswell, What system of burden-sharing between Member States for 
the reception of asylum seekers?, Directorate General For Internal Policies, European Parliament, 2010.  
39 H. Gray, op. cit; and L. Tsourdi, op. cit. 
40 European Commission, Progress report on the Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2018) 301 
final, 16 May 2018. 
41 MEDAM (Mercator Dialogue on Asylum and Migration), Flexible Solidarity: A comprehensive strategy for asylum and 
immigration in the EU, 2018 MEDAM Assessment Report, Kiel: IfW.  
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by funding the common goods that arise from the existence of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(see Chapter 2). Looking at the EU’s multiannual financial planning, the first section provides an 
overview of negotiations and outcomes relevant to the policy areas of asylum management and external 
border control. The main focus is on the period starting with the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
which introduced significant changes in the field of home affairs with potential budgetary implications. 
The second part analyses 17 annual EU budgets, presenting the implementation phase of relevant 
allocations and the resulting level of policy-specific expenditure for the internal dimension of the policy 
areas during the 2000-2016 period. The final Section examines the mobilisation of additional resources 
at EU level following the surge in asylum applications in 2015-2016.  
3.1 Multiannual planning: financial frameworks since the Treaty of Maastricht  
With a view to ensuring an orderly development of its expenditure, the EU sets the maximum level of 
resources (´ceiling´) available for each major category of spending over a period of at least five years 
(usually seven). Known initially as financial perspectives and then as Multiannual Financial Framework 
(MFF), this planning tool translates political priorities into budgetary figures. At present, the MFF is 
formalised in a Council Regulation, which usually implies lengthy negotiations, since it requires 
unanimity of all EU Member States and the European Parliament’s consent.42 
The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht introduced a formal intergovernmental method of cooperation 
between EU governments in the policy areas of justice and home affairs, the bulk of which was grouped 
under the so-called ´third pillar´. In subsequent years, the Council adopted a number of Joint Actions, a 
specific instrument of the third pillar, to finance measures in the fields of external border management 
and asylum from the EU budget.43 However, these instruments remained very limited and short-term.  
The preceding negotiations on the 1993-1999 financial perspectives had focused on different policy 
areas. For example, one major political priority for the period was the further strengthening of cohesion 
policy, complementing the efforts to complete the EU’s single market. Relevant allocations, which were 
designed to help less well-off Member States and regions to catch up in the single market, increased by 
75 % in real terms from 1992 to 1999, reaching ECU 30 billion.44 The share of the EU budget devoted 
to cohesion increased from slightly over 20 % in 1988-1992 to around one third in 1993-1999.45 
The Treaty of Amsterdam, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force two years later, 
incorporated Schengen provisions into the EU framework. With a transitional period of five years for 
the decision-making rules, this Treaty gave competence to the EU in a number of related policy areas of 
justice and home affairs, including external border management, migration and asylum issues. The 
intergovernmental method of the third pillar was maintained for the remaining ones, mainly police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters.46 
For these reasons, reflection on the possible implications for the EU budget of measures in these 
policy areas really started to enter the documents and the debate on the EU’s multiannual financial 
planning only following the signature of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
In the 1998 communication accompanying the Commission proposal for the 2000-2006 
programming period, one strong focus appeared to be on the preparations for the expected accession of 
                                                     
42 For an overview of the EU financing system, see: A. D´Alfonso, A. Delivorias and M. Szczepanski, Economic and 
budgetary outlook for the European Union 2018, EPRS, European Parliament, 2018.  
43 S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Pearson Education Limited, 2000, pp. 16-21, 76 and 123-124. 
44 European Commission, European Union Public Finance, 5th edition, 2014, pp. 45-46. 
45 European Commission, A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union that delivers efficiently 
on its priorities post-2020, COM (2018) 98 final, 14 February 2018, p. 3. 
46 See: S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, Fourth edition, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 8-9.  
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many new Member States to the EU. Home affairs, which include policies relating to external borders, 
asylum and migration, were briefly mentioned when the European Commission noted that the changes 
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in this field would require particular attention for the financing 
of operations coming under these policy areas.47 
The stabilisation of EU expenditure was the main concern during the negotiations that brought to the 
adoption of the 2000-2006 framework. While the Commission figures for pre-accession assistance and 
the estimated costs of the first round of enlargement were confirmed, many other proposed ceilings were 
cut. Justice and home affairs operations were part of heading 3 of the framework, at the time called 
´Internal policies´, which concerned expenditure in many different policy areas, including various 
already well-established measures such as the framework programme for research and the Erasmus 
programme for student mobility. Member States eventually agreed a significant reduction in the 
resources for heading 3 from the level initially proposed by the European Commission, and the relevant 
negotiations did not include a real discussion on the future content of this broad category of 
expenditure.48  
However, during the subsequent negotiations with candidate countries on the terms for the 
enlargement of the EU and the relevant adaptation of the financial framework, attention was devoted 
also to the financing of measures relating to external border control. The final agreement at the 
Copenhagen summit of December 2002 added a specific Schengen Facility to the package initially 
proposed by the EU.49 This Facility was addressed to seven out of the ten Member States that joined the 
EU in May 2004: Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.50 The 
creation of this specific instrument reflected the awareness, already present during the pre-accession 
period, that external border control was one of the policy areas with specific challenges, including in 
institution building, and required investments and resources.51  
The Schengen Facility has since become a recurrent feature of EU enlargements, with the most recent 
example being provided by Article 31 of the Act of accession of the Republic of Croatia.52 The Facility 
is a temporary, one-off instrument that, on the accession of new Member States, provides them with 
financial support for actions relating to the implementation of the Schengen acquis and external borders 
control (e.g. investments in infrastructure and operating equipment, training of border guards and 
support for costs of logistics and operations).53 
In July 2004, the European Commission put forward its proposals for the 2007-2013 Multiannual 
Financial Framework (MFF). Home affairs and justice measures remained under heading 3, which 
became more specific and was relabelled ´Citizen, freedom, security, justice´, since the largest 2000-
2006 funding programmes for internal policies were moved to a newly created subheading 1a 
´Competitiveness for growth and employment´. A specific subheading 3a ´Freedom, security and 
justice´ was created and included both external border control and asylum policies, reflecting the fact 
                                                     
47 European Commission, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament on the establishment of a new financial 
perspective for the period 2000-2006, COM (1998) 164 final, 18 March 1998, p. 10. 
48 For more details on the negotiations see: European Commission, European Union Public Finance, 5th edition, 2014, pp. 63-
65. 
49 European Commission, European Union Public Finance, 5th edition, 2014, p. 70. 
50 As regards the other three new Member States: Cyprus could not yet start the accession process to the Schengen area; the 
Czech Republic had no external land and sea border with non-EU countries; and the Transition Facility tackled the same 
policy areas for Malta. 
51 European Commission, Agenda 2000 - Vol. I: For a stronger and wider Union, - Vol. II: The challenge of enlargement, 
COM (1997) 2000 final, 15 July 1997, pp. 58-59 of Vol. I and pp. 52-53 of Vol. II. 
52 OJ L 112, Volume 55, 24 April 2012, p. 21. 
53 For details on the 2004-2006 implementation of the Schengen Facility: European Commission, Report on implementation 
of the Schengen Facility (2004-2006), COM (2013) 115 final, 12 March 2013. 
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that financing measures in these policy areas were being developed as well as an intention to strengthen 
this trend. 
In this context, the European Commission supported an increased pooling of resources for measures 
relating to external border control, asylum and migration, saying that national administrations were no 
longer able to tackle individually cross-cutting challenges in these policy areas. In addition, the 
Commission considered that the recent enlargement posed specific challenges to the security of the EU’s 
external borders.54 
The reasoning of the Commission included arguments that may easily be related to the concepts of 
EU public goods and fair sharing of responsibility. For example, the European Commission mentioned 
the management of external borders as one of the areas in which critical services were underprovided 
due to a number of drivers such as investments with cross-border benefits which were however financed 
only at national level, and uncoordinated efforts leading to inefficiency in spending. In addition, the 
Commission made reference to an uneven distribution of responsibilities in the policy areas of external 
border control, asylum and migration, calling for some degree of burden-sharing to reinforce solidarity 
between Member States.55 
The name chosen for the framework programme encompassing the four funds56 designed to 
implement relevant measures underlined an increased focus on fair sharing of responsibility: ´Solidarity 
and Management of Migration Flows´ (SOLID). The accompanying communication made an explicit 
reference to the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility as an essential concept for the 
development and implementation of common policies in these domains. The document noted that 
implementing the same standards implied a disproportionate amount of responsibilities for some 
Member States.57 
The European Parliament supported the increase in the resources for external border control, asylum 
and migration put forward by the European Commission, singling out the completion of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice as one of its political priorities for the 2007-2013 period. Parliament 
proposed that the relevant allocation be further strengthened (+€121 million for subheading 3a 
´Freedom, security and justice´ on the Commission proposal) and a sufficient margin be left under the 
budgetary heading to tackle unforeseen needs and developments.58  
However, the 2007-2013 MFF was negotiated against a backdrop that included the stabilisation or 
reduction of their net contributions to the EU budget among the main objectives for a number of Member 
States, and a focus on agricultural and cohesion expenditure for others. This mix resulted in the 
allocations proposed by the Commission for heading 3 being among the ones affected by the highest 
relative reduction in the European Council agreement of December 2005 (a 27 % cut as compared to 
7 % for agriculture and 8 % for cohesion). The reduction in the proposed 2007-2013 commitment 
ceilings for subheading 3a (from €9.21 billion to €6.63 billion in constant 2004 prices, i.e. -28 %) was 
subsequently confirmed in the final agreement of May 2006.59  
Under subheading 3a, the cut for the SOLID general programme was even stronger (-32 %), with 
relevant allocations set at slightly less than €4 billion for seven years down from the proposed 
                                                     
54 European Commission, European Union Public Finance, 5th edition, 2014, pp. 78-79. 
55 European Commission, Financial Perspectives 2007 – 2013, COM (2004) 487 final, 14 July 2004, p. 6 and pp. 9-10. 
56 The four instruments were: 1) European Refugee Fund (ERF); 2) European Fund for the Integration of third-country 
nationals (EIF); 3) European Return Fund (RF); 4) External Borders Fund (EBF).  
57 European Commission, Communication establishing a framework programme on Solidarity and the Management of 
Migration Flows for the period 2007-2013 , COM (2005) 123 final, 6 April 2005, p. 4. 
58 European Parliament, Resolution on Policy Challenges and Budgetary Means of the enlarged Union 2007-2013, 
P6_TA(2005)0224, 8 June 2005. 
59 European Commission, European Union Public Finance, 4th edition, 2008, pp. 109-111. 
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€5.87 billion (both in current prices).60 This means that the 2007-2013 MFF saw an increase in the 
resources for external border control, asylum and migration compared to the very low level of the 
previous programming period, but for an amount lower than the one considered necessary by 
Commission and Parliament. In the final agreement, heading 3 was the smallest expenditure category, 
representing 1.2 % of the MFF (or 0.8 % when considering only subheading 3a). 
The subsequent MFF was the first to be negotiated under the procedure formalised in the Treaty of 
Lisbon. Entered into force on 1 December 2009, the latter eliminated the previous ´pillar structure´ of 
the Treaties and introduced a number of changes in the field of Justice and Home Affairs.61  
In 2010, the preparations for the 2014-2020 MFF started in a difficult context marked by a persistent 
economic crisis in the EU that had been triggered by the global financial crisis three years earlier. In 
October 2010, the European Council stressed that the next MFF should reflect the consolidation efforts 
carried out by Member States at national level.62  
In June 2011, the Commission proposals for the new MFF accordingly froze the overall level of 
resources, taking the 2013 ceiling of the framework then in force as the reference basis for the annual 
level of spending. However, when compared to the 2007-2013 period, the proposals contained shifts of 
resources between headings to make targeted reinforcements for specific programmes possible.63  
Home affairs measures were among the ones for which the proposal included an increased allocation 
of resources. They were kept in a simplified heading 3 ´Security and citizenship´, which was no longer 
divided into subheadings. The Commission proposed that the seven-year funding for home affairs be 
increased from €6.45 billion to €10.91 billion in current prices, of which €3.87 billion would go to a 
fund dealing with asylum and migration and €3.52 billion to the border and visa component of an 
Internal Security Fund (ISF). The remainder of the home affairs allocation would be used for EU 
agencies and IT systems relevant to the policy area, as well as for the security cooperation component 
of the ISF.64  
The European Commission underlined the growing importance of these policies in recent years, their 
role in the creation of an area without internal borders and the changes introduced to them by the Treaty 
of Lisbon, concluding that the mobilisation of the EU budget produced an obvious added value. The 
Commission pointed to the fact that pooling resources in these policy areas is meant to ensure synergies 
and economies of scale by facilitating cooperation and joint solutions to issues that Member States 
cannot tackle acting individually.65 
Along similar lines, the European Parliament called for providing these policy areas with sufficient 
funding and with support tools to handle emergency situations, in its input to the preparation of the next 
MFF ahead of the Commission proposal. Parliament recalled the principle of solidarity and noted the 
relatively small share of resources available for migration, asylum and management of the EU´s external 
                                                     
60 See: European Commission, Communication establishing a framework programme on Solidarity and the Management of 
Migration Flows for the period 2007-2013 , COM (2005) 123 final, 6 April 2005, p. 11; and A. D´Alfonso, EU Funds for 
asylum, migration and borders, EPRS, European Parliament, 2014. 
61 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, The Lisbon Treaty's impact on the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council: 
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63 European Commission, European Union Public Finance, 5th edition, 2014, pp. 101-106. 
64 European Commission, Building an open and secure Europe: the home affairs budget for 2014-2020, COM (2011) 749 
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borders in the 2007-2013 programming period, underlining the need for an integrated approach for these 
policy areas.66  
Previously, the European Parliament had also demanded the establishment of permanent resettlement 
mechanisms endowed with proper funding in the new programming period, while noting that certain 
Member States, especially in southern Europe, were confronted with special challenges due to their 
geographic location.67 
In parallel, further to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, the reflection 
on fair sharing of responsibility gained momentum, in particular in the field of asylum. Financial 
solidarity was one of the axes identified to reinforce intra-EU solidarity in the policy area.68 
The MFF negotiations between Member States were lengthy, confirming the difficult backdrop and 
the major hurdle represented by the unanimity requirement. The European Council managed to agree 
the figures for the 2014-2020 MFF only in February 2013, i.e. 20 months after the Commission 
proposals. For the first time since the introduction of the financial perspectives at the end of the 1980s, 
the result was an MFF that had less resources than its predecessor in real terms (-3.4 % for commitment 
appropriations).69 
The European Parliament criticised the agreement reached in the European Council from very early 
on, but modifications of the ceilings proved impossible. Focusing on a number of changes, which 
included the strengthening of the flexibility provisions of the framework and the introduction of a 
compulsory mid-term review/revision for it, the Parliament eventually gave its consent to the MFF 
Regulation on these conditions, but reiterated its concern that the 2014-2020 ceilings would not provide 
the EU with sufficient means to achieve its stated objectives.70 
As regards heading 3, the outcome of the negotiations was similar to what had happened for the 
2007-2013 MFF, since ´Security and citizenship´ was one of the categories of expenditure where the 
Commission proposal was more significantly cut (-16.6 % as opposed to -4.1 % for cohesion and -4.3 % 
for agricultural expenditure). Ceilings for ´Security and citizenship´ were nevertheless increased by 
more than one quarter on the previous programming period, but the heading remained by far the smallest 
of the MFF (just 1.6 % of the total) due to its low 2007-2013 level. 71  
The cut in the ceilings initially proposed for heading 3 triggered a knock-on reduction in the 2014-
2020 allocations of the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) by 18.9 % compared to the 
Commission proposal. However, geographically pre-allocated resources for Member States´ national 
programmes, which already received the bulk of the funding in the proposal, went untouched, and were 
even slightly increased.72 
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Table 1 shows that the cuts were concentrated on the more limited funding earmarked for 
resettlement and relocation measures and specific actions (-48.6 %) or for Union actions and emergency 
measures managed directly by the European Commission or indirectly by international organisations    
(-39.6 %). Since these measures relate to projects with a clear transnational dimension (e.g. cooperation 
networks, sharing of good practices and development of monitoring and statistical tools) or to financial 
support to respond to specific and unforeseen needs (e.g. a sudden migratory pressure in one Member 
State), the negotiation strategy of Member States for the AMIF appears to have focused on securing 
limited resources for their national programmes based on a known distribution key rather than on 
funding measures with positive cross-border spillovers and on a backstop to channel resources where 
they are most needed in the event of a crisis. The idea of earmarking an additional amount for distribution 
to Member States based on an assessment of significant changes in migration flows emerging from a 
mid-term review was dropped altogether.  
Table 1 – Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF): distribution of 2014-2020 resources 
(€ million) 
 Commission 
proposal (A) 
Final agreement 
(B) 
Diff.  
(C=A-B) 
Diff. % 
(D=C/A) 
National programmes  2 372 2 392 20 0.8% 
Specific actions, Union Resettlement 
Programme and relocation measures 
700 360 -340 -48.6% 
National Programmes: additional 
allocations based on the mid-term 
review 
160 0 -160 -100.0% 
Union actions, emergency assistance, 
European Migration Network and 
technical assistance 
637 385 -252 -39.6% 
Total 3 869 3 137 -732 -18.9% 
Source: Own calculations based on COM (2011) 751 final and Regulation (EU) No 516/2014. 
Along similar lines, the allocations initially proposed for the ISF Borders and Visa were decreased by 
21.6 %, but the reduction was unevenly distributed among the components of the instrument (see 
Table 2). Geographically pre-allocated resources were increased (+6.3 % for the pre-established 
financial envelopes of the national programmes and +2.7 % for the Special Transit Scheme for 
Lithuania). 73  
At first sight, it may look that resources for transnational measures and new developments were much 
less affected by cuts than in the case of the AMIF (only -2.2 % for Union actions and emergency 
assistance). However, for the ISF Borders and Visa, the European Commission had proposed a good 
share of funding for the two financial envelopes that were designed to play a similar role in the context 
of national programmes: 1) €450 million for specific actions, which would finance the purchase of 
means of transport and operating equipment necessary for the joint operations run by Frontex, as well 
as the establishment of consular cooperation mechanisms between at least two Member States to achieve 
economies of scale in the processing of visa applications; and 2) €350 million for a mid-term review, 
which would assign additional resources to Member States based on a distribution key taking into 
account both an analysis of security developments at the external borders in 2014-2016 and a risk 
assessment of relevant threat levels in 2017-2020. The combined allocation of these two components 
was reduced by almost two thirds, confirming that measures where Member States do not know in 
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advance the exact level of resources that they will receive are most likely to be affected by cuts. In 
addition, resources for the development of common IT systems were significantly decreased (-28.1 %).  
Table 2 – Internal Security Fund (ISF) Borders and Visa: distribution of 2014-2020 resources (€ 
million) 
 Commission 
proposal (A) 
Final agreement 
(B) 
Diff.  
(C=A-B) 
Diff. % 
(D=C/A) 
National programmes  1 200 1 276 76 6.3% 
Special Transit Scheme for Lithuania 150 154 4 2.7% 
National Programmes: specific actions  450 147 -303 -67.3% 
National Programmes: additional 
allocations based on the mid-term 
review  
350 128 -222 -63.4% 
IT systems 1 100 791 -309 -28.1% 
Union actions, emergency assistance 
and technical assistance 
270 264 -6 -2.2% 
Total 3 520 2 760 -760 -21.6% 
Source: Own calculations based on COM (2011) 750 final and Regulation (EU) No 515/2014. 
However, soon after the start of the 2014-2020 MFF, the limited resources of heading 3 had to face 
pressure due to a number of challenges, including the significant increase in the number of arrivals of 
asylum-seekers to the EU, which has often been referred to as ´the refugee crisis´. From a budgetary 
perspective, EU institutions and Member States took a number of measures to tackle these challenges, 
which included resorting to, and practically exhausting, the special instruments available under the 
2014-2020 MFF for unforeseen events already during the first years of the framework (see Sections 3.2 
and 3.3). 
These developments meant that the compulsory mid-term review/revision of the MFF, which the 
European Parliament had managed to have in the MFF Regulation (see above), focused among other 
elements on heading 3. While the mid-term revision adopted in June 2017 did not increase the overall 
ceilings of the MFF, it did reinforce the allocations for migration, border and security measures under 
heading 3 by €2.55 billion. In addition, the special instruments of the 2014-2020 MFF were replenished 
and/or strengthened. One decision in this sense was the extension of the scope of the global margin for 
commitments to include migration and security measures. 74  
Table 3 recapitulates the main MFF outcomes relevant to Justice and Home Affairs measures since 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht. The short overview of EU negotiations on multiannual 
budgetary plans provided in this Section shows that attention to common financial resources for external 
border control and asylum management, as part of the expenditure for the broader Justice and Home 
Affairs policy area, has entered the debate and gained some momentum over the years, reflecting 
developments in the relevant institutional framework and, more recently, responding to specific 
challenges and crises.  
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Table 3 – Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) measures in the Multiannual Financial Frameworks 
(MFFs) since the Treaty of Maastricht 
Programming period 1993-1999 2000-2006 2007-2013 2014-2020 
Treaty in force at the 
start of the period 
Maastricht Amsterdam Nice Lisbon 
Heading containing 
JHA measures and its 
share of the agreed 
MFF 
3) Internal policies 
(6 % of the total) 
3) Internal policies  
(6.8 % of the total) 
3) Citizen, 
freedom, security, 
justice (1.2 % of 
the total) 
 
3) Security and 
citizenship 
(1.6 % of the total) 
Features of the 
heading in relation to 
JHA 
JHA is a residual 
element (joint 
actions decided 
by the Council) of 
a broad heading. 
JHA is a limited 
component of a 
much broader 
heading. 
JHA is a significant 
part of a policy-
specific heading. 
Two subheadings 
(border control 
and asylum under 
3a).  
JHA is a significant 
part of a policy-
specific heading. 
Elimination of 
subheadings. 
Cut to the initial 
Commission proposal 
for the heading 
N/A N/A 27 % 16.6 % 
Cut to the overall 
MFF proposal 
N/A N/A 13 % 8.2 % 
Main intermediary 
adaptations relevant 
to the JHA heading 
- Schengen Facility 
for new Member 
States introduced 
with enlargement. 
- Mid-term revision 
reinforces 
flexibility 
provisions and 
some JHA 
allocations.  
Source: Own elaboration (MFF figures based on: European Union Public Finance, 5th edition, 2014) 
Financial envelopes for Justice and Home affairs have been introduced and progressively developed in 
the budgetary framework, but they have grown at a relatively low pace. The policy areas related to the 
removal of controls at the EU’s internal borders have remained a limited share of the EU budget contrary 
to what had happened for other major EU projects, such as the completion of the single market in the 
1990s (coupled with a significant reinforcement of resources for cohesion policies) and enlargement in 
the years 2000s (first with pre-accession assistance and subsequently with resources for cohesion 
policies).  
The drivers of this relatively slow progression of budgetary envelopes for Justice and Home affairs 
include many of the same institutional challenges that characterise their policy developments at EU 
level. In particular, Monar (2010) has highlighted: the particular sensitivity of the related policy fields 
that are often very close to the core functions of the state; the intergovernmental nature of the initial 
cooperation in these domains, which has had an impact on subsequent developments (including once 
the initial forms of cooperation have been integrated into the EU framework); and the significant 
operational dimension in many policy fields of Justice and Home Affairs, which brings Member States 
to retain maximum control of relevant means (for example, in the initial design of Frontex).75 
In addition, specific features of the EU budgetary negotiations and cycles contribute to explaining 
the reasons why the pooling of financial resources at EU level for Justice and Home affairs has remained 
rather limited, though increasing over time.  
                                                     
75 J. Monar (ed.), The institutional dimension of the European Union's area of freedom, security, and justice, College of 
Europe studies no. 11, P.I.E. Peter Lang, 2010, pp. 23-32.  
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The momentum for policy developments in the areas of Justice and Home Affairs has increased at times 
when budgetary negotiations, among other things, focused on the stabilisation and/or the reduction of 
the overall volume of the EU budget, thus creating a potential competition in the allocation of financial 
resources with traditional EU policy areas. 
While the unanimity requirement for the MFF has not prevented the EU budget from evolving over 
time, it makes budgetary reform slower and more difficult to achieve. In MFF negotiations, Member 
States with similar objectives cooperate and three main groups have regularly been identified in relevant 
press reporting: ´friends of cohesion´, ´friends of agriculture´ and ´friends of correction mechanisms´ 
(or better spending or budgetary cuts). Cuts to the financial envelopes proposed by the European 
Commission have been more significant in relative terms for the heading including Justice and Home 
Affairs measures than for the headings devoted to agriculture and cohesion or the overall MFF. 
Up to the negotiations for the 2014-2020 MFF included, no group of ´friends of justice and home 
affairs´ is reported to have emerged suggesting that frontline Member States, for which increasing EU 
investment in external border control and asylum management could reasonably be seen as an objective, 
represented a minority. Therefore, it is likely that such a minority was unable to broker a more ambitious 
agreement for the financial envelopes of these policy areas despite the push of the European Commission 
and of the European Parliament in this direction. 
Finally, Member States in the Council appear to favour programmes and funds with geographically 
pre-allocated resources, which allow them to know in advance the exact level of funding that they will 
receive. This preference may contribute to explaining not only the relatively more limited cuts to the 
financial proposals for cohesion and agriculture, but also the fact that reductions in Home Affairs funds 
have concentrated in the components with a more prominent transnational dimension of common public 
goods (as shown by Table 1 and Table 2 for the 2014-2020 AMIF and ISF Borders and Visa).  
3.2 Actual expenditure in the 2000-2016 EU budgets 
This section looks at budgetary execution, showing the actual level of EU policy-specific expenditure 
on external border control and asylum management into which the allocative decisions made in 
negotiations on multiannual planning have translated. The period examined starts with the first financial 
year following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, given the very limited and ad-hoc nature 
of EU expenditure in the two policy areas prior to this date (see Section 3.1). 
The trend of EU expenditure on external border control, asylum and migration management is 
expressed in terms of their share of the overall EU budget and as a percentage of EU’s gross national 
income (GNI). Since GNI is often referred to, on the revenue side, as an indicator of Member States´ 
capacity to contribute to the EU budget, using it to analyse the expenditure side may in turn help to have 
a proxy of the EU budget´s capacity to finance common goods (see Chapter 2). 
The analysis is built on the payment outturns76 of policy-specific measures relevant to external border 
control, asylum and migration management in the EU budget over the 2000-2016 period. Four main 
categories of relevant expenditure are identified: 
 EU funding programmes, which (co-)finance measures in Member States and finance a number of 
common activities such as emergency assistance: the ISF Borders and Visa and its predecessor the 
External Borders Fund (EBF) for external border control;77 and the AMIF and its predecessors 
                                                     
76 The EU budget has two different figures for most categories of expenditure: commitment appropriations and payment 
appropriations. Being legal pledges to provide finance once given conditions are met, commitments do not necessarily lead 
to payments in the same financial year. Payment outturns are the actual level of payments carried out in a given year within 
the limits authorised by the EU budgetary authority.  
77 The ISF Police, which mainly deals with different aspects of Justice and Home Affairs policies, has not been taken into 
account.  
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(the European Refugee Fund (ERF), the European Fund for the Integration of third-country 
nationals (EIF) and the European Return Fund RF)) for asylum and migration. 
 Pilot projects and Preparatory Actions, which may result in the establishment of new funding 
programmes or in the integration of new categories of measures in the existing funds. 
 Decentralised EU agencies, which receive transfers from the EU budget for their activities and 
operations: the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), the European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) and the European Agency for the Operational Management of large-scale 
IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA). 
 IT systems designed to facilitate cooperation in the policy areas: the Schengen Information System 
(SIS II) and the Visa Information System (VIS) in the area of border controls; and the European 
Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (EURODAC) to record fingerprints of asylum-seekers, which are 
used to determine the Member State in charge of processing a given application on the basis of the 
Dublin Regulation (usually the first country of entry into the EU).  
Figure 1 shows the share of the EU budget taken by the two policy areas together and their respective 
components. In 2000, expenditure started in the field of asylum and migration, mainly in relation to the 
creation of the first European Refugee Fund (ERF), and represented just some 0.2 % of EU budget in 
that financial year. 
Over the first half of the 2000-2006 programming period, the share of the EU budget taken by the 
two policy areas together remained around similarly low percentages. Expenditure on external border 
control explains much of the increase registered as of 2004, which is mainly determined by the resources 
allocated to new Member States under the Schengen Facility and the Kaliningrad Facility (see Section 
3.1), and to a much lower extent by the establishment of the Frontex Agency, which received its first 
resources (€4.66 million) from the EU in 2005. These developments brought the two policy areas to 
represent jointly 0.4 % of the EU budget in the final year of the 2000-2006 financial perspectives.  
Figure 1 – Internal dimension of EU policies on external border controls, asylum and migration: 
payments outturns as % of the EU budget (2000-2016) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from EU budgets 2002-2018 
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At the start of the 2007-2013 MFF, the share of the EU budget spent on external borders, asylum and 
migration dropped to less than 0.2 %. The decrease was partly triggered by the end of the payments 
under the Schengen Facility, but suggests as well that these relatively new policy areas may be affected 
more than others from the transition to a new programming period. Subsequently, their joint share started 
to increase again (although irregularly) in line with the gradual uptake of the four funding instruments 
(EBF, ERF, EIF and RF), that the EU regrouped under the General Programme SOLID (see Section 
3.1).  
In 2013, the share of the EU budget spent on policy-specific measures for external border control, 
asylum and migration eventually reached 0.6 %. In addition to the implementation of the instruments 
under SOLID, the development of Frontex, the creation of new EU agencies (grants to EASO as of 2010 
and to eu-LISA as of 2012) and investments in IT systems such as SIS II, VIS and EURODAC 
contributed to this trend. Expenditure appears to be more evenly distributed between external border 
control on the one hand and asylum and migration on the other as compared to the previous 
programming period. However, allocations for the former are higher than for the latter in each financial 
year, and often significantly so (i.e. in 2008 and in 2011-2013). 
The decline in the share of the EU budget (jointly from 0.6 % in 2013 to 0.45 % in 2014) again 
characterised the first year of the new MFF for the two policy areas, and especially so for asylum and 
migration management. This data confirms that the transition between programming periods may 
present a number of difficulties for relevant funding instruments.  
In particular, the late agreement on the 2014-2020 MFF had a knock-on effect on the adoption of the 
AMIF and ISF Regulations78 and on the subsequent finalisation of their national programmes,79 delaying 
the start of their implementation and triggering the reprogramming of their 2014 allocations to the 2015-
2017 budgets.80 
In 2015 and 2016, the overall EU expenditure on the policy areas significantly increased, which 
reflects not only the gradual uptake of the new Funds but also the additional resources that EU 
Institutions and Member States decided to mobilise through the flexibility provisions of the MFF (see 
Section 3.3). These decisions were part of broader packages of measures that were taken to address the 
significant surge in the number of asylum-seekers and migrants arriving to the EU, against the backdrop 
of limited ceilings for the relevant MFF heading (see Section 3.1).81  
The extensive resort to flexibility tools in the framework of the refugee crisis resulted in the total 
expenditure on asylum, migration and external border control exceeding 1 % of EU budget payments 
for the first time in 2016. The same year, EU expenditure on asylum and migration management 
exceeded that on external border control, which had not been the case since 2003. 
Based on the same data on payment outturns, Figure 2 presents them in relation to EU GNI and 
shows similar patterns. During the 2000-2006 period, the resources pooled together by EU Member 
States for the internal dimension of the two policy areas remained limited. Their peak, which mainly 
depended on expenditure for external border control, was at 0.0036 % of EU GNI in the final year of 
the framework. 
                                                     
78 Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 and Regulation (EU) No 515/2014. 
79 This was the case for many EU funding instruments implemented under shared management (Member States with the 
European Commission). 
80 A. D´Alfonso, Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), EPRS, European Parliament, 2015; A. D´Alfonso, Internal 
Security Fund (ISF), EPRS, European Parliament 2016. 
81 In 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker included migration among the ten political priorities of its Commission. The following year, 
the European Commission adopted two strategic documents setting priorities relevant to the policy areas of asylum, 
migration and external border control: European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final, 13 May 2015; and European 
Agenda on Security, COM(2015) 185 final, 28 April 2015. 
External border control and asylum management as EU common goods. A budgetary perspective 
European University Institute 19 
Following an initial decline in the share of EU GNI devoted to external border control, asylum and 
migration at EU level, the 2007-2013 period continued with a rather gradual (but sometimes irregular) 
increase of the indicator as of the second year of the MFF. The peak was again reached at the end of the 
programming period (0.0066 % of EU GNI in 2013). Expenditure was more evenly distributed between 
the two policy areas, to which the streamlining and strengthening of previous instruments, pilot projects 
and preparatory actions into the four funds of the SOLID programme may have contributed. 
Figure 2 – Internal dimension of EU policies on external border controls, asylum and migration: 
payments outturns as % of the EU GNI (2000-2016) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from EU budgets 2002-2018 and GNI data from the European Commission 
In 2014, the new MFF again started with a decrease in the share of EU GNI channelled through the EU 
budget to address the internal dimension of the policy areas. The following year, the indicator almost 
recovered its 2013 level (0.0065 %). Read in conjunction with the data from Figure 1, the figure 
indicates that the 2015 EU budget was smaller than the 2013 EU budget as a percentage of EU GNI, 
which is in line with the consolidation efforts that had permeated the negotiations on the 2014-2020 
MFF (see Section 3.1). In 2016, the uptake of the new funds (AMIF and ISF Borders and Visa) and the 
additional resources mobilised by EU Institutions in the wake of the refugee crisis led to the highest 
level of the indicator in the time series: 0.013 % of EU GNI. In other words, as share of the Union´s 
GNI, EU budget payments on external border control, asylum and migration management doubled in 
one year, which confirms the financial efforts undertaken to respond to the refugee crisis in an MFF 
characterised by tight ceilings for heading 3. 
Looking at absolute figures over the 2000-2016 period, the total payment outturns amount to 
€3.5 billion for asylum and migration, and to €4.83 billion for external border control (in current prices). 
The additional resources mobilised in the wake of the refugee crisis marked a significant change of pace 
in the financing of measures for the former: EU budgetary payments for asylum and migration policies 
in one financial year alone (2016) represent one third of total payments in the entire reference period of 
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implies that part of the commitments undertaken in the context of the European Agenda on Migration 
will result in actual payments in the years following 2016 (see Section 3.3). 
Figure 3 – Internal dimension of EU policies on external border controls, asylum and migration: 
payments outturns by broad categories of expenditure (2000-2016) 
  
Source: Own calculations based on data from EU budgets 2002-2018 
The classification of payment outturns by broad categories of expenditure (Figure 3) shows a difference 
between the two policy areas. The bulk of the payments (97.5 %) for asylum and migration management 
concerns EU funding instruments such as the AMIF and its predecessors. In the case of external border 
control, the share of the payments allocated to decentralised agencies (24.5 %) and IT systems (8 %) is 
higher, suggesting that the development of common resources and tools may be more advanced in this 
policy area. In turn, this feature may contribute to explaining why the decrease in payment outturns at 
the beginning of the current programming period has been less significant for external border control 
than for asylum and migration (see above). 
The analysis of payments outturns resorts to two simplifications. The first concerns the attribution of 
expenditure items to the policy areas in question. The distribution of items between external border 
control and asylum/migration that the European Commission currently uses in its budgetary documents 
is applied to the entire 2000-2016 period. The objective is to avoid having the same item of expenditure 
move from one policy area to the other, depending on the financial year (as it happened for a few items 
in EU budgetary reporting over the reference period). In any case, it should be noted that the distinction 
is sometimes blurred and some items of expenditure may be at the crossroads of the two policy areas, 
but are then attributed to the predominant component in the calculations. 
The second simplification relates to the variable geometry of participation in the policy areas of 
external border control, asylum and migration. As Monar (2010) points out, EU cooperation on the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice is characterised by a high degree of differentiation, which varies 
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depending on the issue at stake. 82 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom have different kinds of 
opt-outs, while four non-EU Member States (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) are 
Schengen Associated Countries. 
This complexity is reflected in the budgetary arrangements in place for the related policy areas, 
including external border control and asylum and migration management. For example, at present 
Ireland and the United Kingdom neither take part in nor finance the ISF Borders and Visa and the same 
applies to Denmark in the case of the AMIF.  
Conversely, Schengen Associated Countries participate in and contribute to measures with budgetary 
implications relevant to their Association Agreement such as the ISF Borders and Visa and the financing 
of Frontex. The four EU Member States (Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus and Romania) that are Schengen 
candidate countries but not yet part of the Area do take part in relevant measures. 
In addition, in some cases, EU Member States with an opt-out may opt into specific measures on an 
ad-hoc basis. For example, the United Kingdom did contribute to Frontex operational activities,83 and 
currently participates in the law enforcement aspects of the SIS II database84 (but not in the SIS II 
elements related to border control).  
The indicator expressing expenditure in terms of GNI uses the EU GNI for the sake of simplicity and 
comparability with EU budgetary data. This simplification should not alter the overall representativeness 
of the indicator, since most Member States participate in both policy areas, while the remaining ones 
take part at least in one and usually to some extent in the other. 
The GNI-based indicator makes it possible to compare roughly the pooling of financial resources 
through the EU budget with Federal expenditure in the United States (US), where the policy areas of 
external border control, migration and asylum are much more centralised.85  
  
                                                     
82 J. Monar (ed.), op. cit, pp. 32-33.  
83 UK Home Office, United Kingdom contribution to Frontex operation from 2012 to 2014, FOI release 31769, 18 July 2014. 
84 L. Dearden, EU-wide information system threatened by Brexit used by UK 539 million times every year, police say, 
Independent, 2 May 2018. 
85 As regards the US, the calculation takes into account the annual resources of relevant organisations and programmes within 
the following Departments: Homeland Security (US Customs & Border Protection, US Coast Guard, US Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement, US Citizenship & Immigration Services); Justice (Executive Office for Immigration Review); State 
(Refugee Admissions, Consular and Border Security Programme); Health & Human Services (Refugee programmes); and 
Labor (Office of Foreign Labor Certification). 
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Figure 4 – Expenditure on external border control, migration and asylum at federal level in the 
United States of America and through the EU budget in the European Union as % of their 
respective GNIs (2013-2016) 
 
Source: Own calculations (based on: EU budgets 2015-2018; EU GNI data from the European Commission; US Federal 
budgets; and US GNI data from OECD).  
While the significant differences that characterise the two systems have to be kept in mind,86 Figure 4 
shows that the pooling of resources for the policy areas in question in the US is much higher than in the 
EU, representing yearly between 0.2 % and 0.21 % of the US GNI over the 2013-2016 period. In 2016, 
when EU budget expenditure on the internal dimension of the policy areas reached its peak, its share 
represented 0.013 % of the EU GNI. On average, during the 2013-2016 period, the share of their 
respective GNI centrally invested in the policy areas was around 31 times higher in the US than in the 
EU.  
From a different perspective and assuming an EU budget stable in size at 1 % of the Union´s GNI, 
around 20 % of the EU budget would be needed for external border control, asylum and migration to 
have a level of investment in the policy areas equivalent to that of the US. 
To summarise, the funds channelled for external border control, asylum and migration by Member 
States through the EU budget have started from a very low level. Over time, the pooling of resources 
has gradually increased before a significant change of pace took place in the context of the numerous 
measures taken to respond to the 2015-2016 crisis. However, its level remains distant from that observed 
in the US where such policies are much more centralised. 
                                                     
86 For example, in the field of borders, some of the US federal organisations have also tasks related to customs and 
environmental protection, while the EU´s Frontex may play a role in these domains but to a lesser extent.  
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3.3 Resources mobilised in the wake of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis 
Recent years have seen a surge in the number of asylum applications lodged in the EU (see Figure 5), 
which was concentrated in some Member States. Between 2006 and 2010, the annual number of 
applications across the EU oscillated between 197 000 and 263 000. After annual increases as of 2011, 
it soared in 2015 and 2016 (some 2.6 million applications in two years) and went down to 705 000 in 
2017. The peak in inflows and applications reached in 2015 and 2016 has been often identified as the 
migration and refugee crisis. The EU and its Member States have taken multiple measures, including 
with implications for the EU budget, to respond to it.  
The analysis of 2000-2016 payment execution for the internal dimension of asylum, migration and 
external border policies gives an idea of the initial budgetary impact of relevant measures, shown in 
particular by the significant 2016 increase in payment outturns for these policy areas (see Figures 1 and 
2 in Section 3.2).  
However, for several reasons, payment outturns do not capture the overall budgetary efforts deployed 
for the internal dimension of the policies at EU level in the wake of the refugee crisis. The distinction 
between commitments and payments in EU budgetary provisions means that part of the commitments 
subscribed to in 2015-2016 should lead to payments only in subsequent years. In addition, in some cases, 
implementation has been slower than initially planned.87 Finally, agreed measures have implied 
reinforcements of relevant appropriations not only in 2015 and 2016, but also in subsequent years.  
Figure 5 – Asylum applications in the EU (thousands, 2006-2017)  
 
                                                     
87 For example, in 2017 payment appropriations for the AMIF and the ISF were decreased by €275 million due to the late 
adoption of legal bases and delay in programming. See: Definitive adoption (EU, Euratom) 2017/30 of amending budget 
No 5 of the European Union for the financial year 2017, OJ L 9, 12 January 2018. 
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In the 2015-2018 EU budgets, commitment appropriations allocated to the internal dimension of the 
policy areas amount to €9.5 billion according to European Commission documents of May 2018.88 
Given the tight expenditure ceilings available for heading 3 in the 2014-2020 MFF (see Section 3.1), 
redeployments from other budgetary lines were largely insufficient to ensure the financing of agreed 
measures, which thus required the utilisation of the flexibility provisions and tools of the MFF.  
Table 4 recapitulates the flexibility tools that have been mobilised to ensure the reinforcements of 
allocations under heading 3 of the EU budget over the 2015-2018 period. The Flexibility Instrument and 
the Contingency margin were respectively used four times and twice to this effect, jointly covering 
almost half (46 %) of the financing for asylum, migration and borders measures. This percentage and 
the fact that the Contingency margin is a last resort tool demonstrate the significant pressure to which 
heading 3 has been exposed over the reference period, due to its initial level of financing decided in the 
MFF negotiations.  
Table 4 – Flexibility tools mobilised to reinforce allocations for asylum, migration and borders 
under heading 3 of the EU budget (2015-2018) 
Date Decision Tool Relevant budget Amount 
(€ million) 
04/12/2015 Decision (EU) 
2015/2248  
Flexibility Instrument Amending Budget 7/2015 66 
25/11/2015 Decision (EU) 
2016/253  
Flexibility Instrument EU budget 2016 1 506 
14/12/2016 Decision (EU) 
2017/339  
Contingency margin Amending Budget 4/2016 240 
14/12/2016 Decision (EU) 
2017/342  
Flexibility Instrument EU budget 2017 530 
14/12/2016 Decision (EU) 
2017/344  
Contingency margin EU budget 2017 1 176 
12/12/2017 Decision (EU) 2018/8  Flexibility Instrument EU budget 2018 837 
Total amount financed by flexibility tools 4 355 
Heading 3 : Share of 2015-2018 measures for migration and borders financed by flexibility 
tools  
46 % 
Source: Own elaboration (based on EU budgets 2015-2018 and European Commission data). 
The additional resources have been used to strengthen the AMIF and the ISF, especially their emergency 
assistance measures, as well as decentralised agencies active in the policy areas such as Frontex and 
EASO. Reinforcements have gone beyond the cuts operated to the heading by the European Council in 
the context of MFF negotiations (see Section 3.1). 
In addition to enhancing existing tools, the extra allocations have funded a new instrument for the 
provision of humanitarian aid within the EU,89 which has been used to provide assistance to asylum 
seekers and migrants in need in Greece through partner organisations such as UN agencies, Red Cross 
societies and non-governmental organisations (more than €600 million by April 2018).90 
                                                     
88 European Commission, Statement of estimates for the financial year 2019, SEC(2018) 250, May 2018, p. 9. In reporting 
on budgetary measures relevant to migration and refugees, the Commission usually include the entire ISF and not only the 
ISF Borders and Visa, which has some 73 % of the total allocations of the Fund. 
89 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/369 of 15 March 2016 on the provision of emergency support within the Union. This is not 
to be confused with emergency assistance available under the AMIF. 
90 ECHO Factsheet, Emergency Support Instrument, May 2018. 
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Table 5 – Initial and March 2018 commitment allocations of certain migration-related spending 
of the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (€ million) 
Fund/instrument Initial 2014-2020 
allocation 
2014-2020 allocation 
as of March 2018 
Increase (%) 
AMIF 3 137 6 654 112 % 
ISF 3 764 3 882 3 % 
Emergency support within the 
EU 
0 647 New 
SIS 69 91 32 % 
VIS 69 81 17 % 
EURODAC 1 1 0 % 
FRONTEX 628 1 638 161 % 
EASO 109 456 318 % 
Data source: Z. Darvas, G. Wolff, F. Chiacchio, K. Efstathiou and I. Gonçalves Raposo, EU funds for migration, asylum and 
integration policies, Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union, European Parliament, March 2018, p. 15 (with the 
additional calculation of relative increases). 
A study for the European Parliament's Committee on Budgets estimates how much the 2014-2020 
allocations of individual funds and instruments under heading 3 have been strengthened as compared to 
the initial financial programming.91 Using these data, Table 5 calculates their relative increases, showing 
that these are especially high for the AMIF, EASO and Frontex.  
All these elements suggest that the increased solidarity registered in terms of payment outturns for 
the policy areas in 2016 (see Section 3.2) should be confirmed in the remaining years of the 2014-2020 
MFF as a result of the reinforcements that EU Institutions and Member States have agreed for relevant 
instruments and funds.  
4. Other relevant financial resources in the EU budget  
Article 80 TFEU specifies that the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility governs the 
policies of border control, asylum and migration set out in Articles 77-79 TFEU, as part of the broader 
provisions on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Chapter 3 has analysed relevant resources in 
the EU budget. However, EU programmes and funds from other policy areas may finance measures that 
are to some extent related to border control, asylum and migration. This Chapter provides an overview 
of such instruments and expenditure, which are not directly linked to Article 80 TFEU, identifying those 
that finance measures within the European Union and those that address the external dimension of the 
policy areas.  
4.1 Other resources allocated within the European Union  
In addition to the policy-specific resources under heading 3 ´Security and citizenship´, the other 
headings of the EU budget, which deal with internal policies but focus on different policy areas, may 
contribute to measures relating to refugees and more broadly to migrants.  
Subheading 1b ´Economic, social and territorial cohesion´ provides one such example, in particular 
through its European Social Fund (ESF), which among other objectives seeks to promote social 
inclusion. Already in its proposals for the 2007-2013 MFF, the European Commission called for an 
increased participation of third-country nationals in ESF-supported measures with a view to promoting 
                                                     
91 Z. Darvas, G. Wolff, F. Chiacchio, K. Efstathiou and I. Gonçalves Raposo, EU funds for migration, asylum and integration 
policies, Directorate General for Internal Policies of the Union, European Parliament, March 2018. 
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their integration.92 A recent financial contribution in this spirit is the €0.89 million ESF-funding to a 
Refugee employment pilot scheme developed by German authorities, which helped asylum-seekers take 
initial steps towards integration into the labour market.93 In 2016, in the context of the mid-term 
technical revision of the 2014-2020 financial envelopes assigned to Member States under cohesion 
policy, the European Commission encouraged those who benefitted from an upward revision to use the 
additional allocations on the basis of their specific needs in a number of policy areas, which included 
projects relating to refugees and migrants.94  
The ESF is usually seen as the European fund with the highest potential for complementarity with 
the AMIF, in particular in the field of integration of third-country nationals. Though with varying 
degrees, experiences from many Member States show efforts to ensure complementarity between the 
two funds, which may include coordination mechanisms between the managing authorities in charge of 
the two funds that are usually located in different ministries (often the Ministry of Interior for the AMIF 
and the Ministries of Welfare or Employment for the ESF). Responsible authorities quote the limited 
resources available under the AMIF (Germany) as well as administrative and legal difficulties posed by 
different sets of rules (Sweden) among the obstacles to further promoting complementarity between the 
AMIF and the ESF.95  
The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), which is likewise part of the cohesion heading 
of the budget, may also finance projects aimed at the integration of migrant and refugees in local 
communities. Its Urban Innovative Actions (URBACT) initiative has included such measures among its 
priorities, financing projects to revive towns with a declining and ageing population.96  
Under subheading 1a ´Competitiveness for growth and jobs´, an example comes from the EU 
programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (COSME) 
which allocates part of its resources to financing projects that promote the creation, the improvement 
and the wider distribution of support schemes for migrant entrepreneurs. The European Commission 
launched a €2.22 million call for proposals covering such schemes in February 2018.97 In addition, in 
the wake of the refugee crisis, the 2017 Work Programme of Horizon 2020 (research and development) 
was revised to include five new research topics on migration and asylum. 
In the policy area of education, training and youth, which is under the same budgetary subheading, 
the Erasmus+ programme can also finance projects with some relevance to refugee and migrants, such 
as the €0.22 million grant for the International Youth Volunteering programme in the United Kingdom. 
The initiative has enabled 26 young volunteers to contribute to the inclusion at local level of vulnerable 
groups ranging from the elderly to refugee and migrant communities.98  
Support may arrive also from heading 2 of the EU budget, ‘Sustainable growth: natural resources´ 
as shown by the contribution of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) to 
the Immigrant Villages project in Finland. Under this scheme, the rural municipality of Punkalaidun 
                                                     
92 European Commission, Financial Perspectives 2007 – 2013, Communication to the Council and the European Parliament, 
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93 European Commission, European Social Fund projects website, Building a better future for refugees, 9 September 2016. 
94 European Commission, COM(2016) 311 final, 30 June 2016, p. 5. 
95 European Migration Network, 21 responses to ad-Hoc Query on implementation of the AMIF requested by the French 
Ministry of Interior on 28 December 2016. 
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supported the integration of asylum-seekers, refugees and migrants arriving in the area, facilitating their 
access to training and work opportunities.99 
In case of need, for example in emergency situations such as a strong migratory pressure, other EU 
budgetary instruments that may be mobilised include the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived 
(FEAD) under subheading 1b or the EU Civil Protection Mechanism under heading 3.  
Likewise, measures relating to external border control and protection may be among the objectives 
covered by other EU programmes and funds. A case in point under subheading 1a is the Horizon 2020 
framework programme for research and development. Its Secure Societies component, which is 
endowed with around €1.7 billion for the 2014-2020 period,100 includes the improvement of border 
management and security among a number of other objectives.101 Financing can go to research projects 
covering different aspects of border management ranging from technological solutions for maritime 
border surveillance to optimization of border control processes and planning at crossing points.102  
Copernicus, the European Union's Earth Observation Programme, offers an additional example for 
border management under subheading 1a, since its Security Service provides real time data on what is 
happening around the EU’s land and sea borders. Frontex manages the border surveillance component 
of this service, with a view to supporting the EU’s external border surveillance information exchange 
framework (EUROSUR).103 Likewise, the other space project under subheading 1a, the EU’s satellite 
navigation programme Galileo, is expected to provide new security-related applications for border-
control authorities.104  
Table 6 recapitulates the main examples per heading. However, the European Commission does not 
produce reports on the financial resources spent on projects relating to the internal dimension of border 
and asylum management under EU programmes and funds other than those specifically devoted to these 
policy areas. Neither allow published budgetary data identifying and disentangling such payments 
outside heading 3 or providing a complete overview of them. 
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Table 6 – Examples of other 2014-2020 EU instruments for internal policies with some relevance 
to asylum, migration and external border control 
Heading/subheading Programme/Fund Some projects may concern 
1a) Competitiveness for 
growth and jobs 
Copernicus (Earth Observation Programme) External border control 
COSME (Competitiveness of Enterprises and 
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) 
Asylum/migration 
Erasmus + Asylum/migration 
Galileo (Satellite navigation programme)  External border control 
Horizon 2020 framework programme for 
research and development 
Asylum/migration 
External border control 
1b) Economic, social and 
territorial cohesion 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) Asylum/migration 
European Social Fund (ESF) Asylum/migration 
Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived 
(FEAD) 
Asylum/migration 
2) Sustainable growth: 
natural resources 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD) 
Asylum/migration 
3) Security and 
citizenship 
EU Civil Protection Mechanism Asylum/migration 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The related financial resources do not fall under the direct remit of Article 80 TFEU. In addition, they 
are not likely to modify significantly the overall level of policy-specific expenditure analysed in Section 
3.2, since border, asylum and migration related projects tend to be a minority component of programmes 
and funds with different and much broader objectives. In the case of measures for the integration of 
refugees and migrants, this assumption may be reinforced by the fact that the EU budget represents an 
extremely limited share of public social expenditure in the EU, estimated at 0.3 % of the total.105 
From a partially different perspective focusing on the resources mobilised by the EU to tackle the 
migration and refugee crisis, which also included funding from external policy instruments (see Section 
4.2), the European Court of Auditors (ECA) recommended that the European Commission should 
provide comprehensive reporting on such financial resources, noting that this was not yet the case.106  
The European Commission accepted the Court´s recommendation that the European Parliament 
supported, calling for an increase in budgetary transparency by means of a single heading that would 
regroup all the budget lines financing migration policy. In addition, Parliament asked for the 
Commission to produce estimates of the relevant costs involved per migrant or asylum-seeker in 
individual Member States.107  
4.2 Resources allocated outside the European Union  
Under its heading 4, ´Global Europe´, the EU budget finances the external dimension of asylum, 
migration and border policies through geographic and thematic instruments of EU external relation 
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policies. Examples are provided by the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which includes a 
specific Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic programme, the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA II). In the event 
of man-made or natural disasters, the EU budget provides needs-based humanitarian assistance. 
In addition, resources from the European Development Fund (EDF), an intergovernmental Fund 
outside the EU budget,108 can be allocated to measures relevant to the policy areas of asylum, migration 
and borders in the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) that it targets. The Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility is the EU strategic framework for cooperation with third countries 
in the areas of migration and asylum.109 
Funding outside the EU supports a variety of measures, for example in third countries facing high 
refugee inflows due to a crisis in a neighbouring country. Relevant activities include humanitarian aid 
and support to refugees and their host communities, by means of projects focusing on food security, 
livelihoods and education. Other examples are activities that seek to address the root causes of irregular 
migration and displaced persons, by improving stability, security, economic development and the 
provision of basic services in countries of origin. 
According to European Commission data of May 2018, measures relevant to the policy areas of 
asylum, migration and borders outside the European Union were overall allocated some €12.5 billion in 
the 2015-2018 period. This amount represents 57 % of the total EU funding planned (but not necessarily 
spent) over those four years in response to the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, while the remaining 43 % has 
been allocated to the internal dimension of the policy areas under the remit of Article 80 TFEU.110 As it 
was the case for heading 3 (see Section 3.3), the 2015-2016 refugee crisis put a significant pressure on 
the MFF heading devoted to external action, which led EU Institutions and Member States to resort to 
the flexibility provisions of the MFF in order to mobilise resources on top of those available under 
heading 4 in the 2014-2020 framework.111  
In addition, new instruments at least partially outside the EU budget were established: the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the EU Trust Fund for Syria (MADAD Fund) and the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey. The EU Trust Funds present different features from the Facility, which has been 
created following the EU-Turkey statement. However, they share a number of objectives. These 
instruments are meant to be faster and more agile in the response to emergency situations than traditional 
EU funds and programmes. Furthermore, while being financed with transfers from traditional 
instruments (e.g. the EDF, the DCI and the ENI), they aim to attract additional contributions from other 
donors, mainly EU Member States, again with a view to tackling the limitations of the 2014-2020 
MFF.112  
Table 7 shows the distribution of the planned EU funding outside the European Union over the 2015-
2018 period, as of December 2017. The new instruments created at least partially outside the EU budget, 
which appear in italics in the table, play a significant role in the management of the external dimension 
of migration and borders, since the two EU Trust Funds relevant to the policy areas and the Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey are planned to channel one third of the total resources.  
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Table 7 – Planned EU funding for the refugee crisis and migration management outside the 
European Union over the 2015-2018 period (€ billion, as of December 2017) 
Expenditure category/instrument Resources 
Humanitarian aid 3.5 
EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa 2.6 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI): Return of refugees and displaced persons, 
aid and support to migrants, fight against root causes of migration 
1.6 
Pledges from London Conference (February 2016) and Brussels Conference (April 2017) 
supporting the future of Syria and the region 
1.6 
Facility for Refugees in Turkey  1.0 
Support to livelihood opportunities, health, education for refugees and mobility policy 0.8 
EU Trust Fund for Syria (excluding its contribution to the Facility for Refugees in Turkey) 0.6 
Support to stabilisation and peace, security and border management of third countries 0.4 
Support to border and migration management in Turkey and the Western Balkans 0.3 
Total 12.4 
Data source: European Commission factsheet (December 2017). 
The table does not include contributions from EU Member States that appear to have been more 
substantial for the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (representing two thirds of its first € 3 billion tranche) 
than for the Trust Funds. While a compulsory distribution key for national contributions was agreed for 
the Facility, the Trust Funds resort to voluntary pledges from national authorities against the backdrop 
of an overall financing target set by the European Commission. 
In June 2018, the European Council confirmed its support to these instruments, by agreeing on the 
launch of the extension of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (an additional €3 billion for the 2018-
2019 period) as well as on the transfer of a further €500 million from EDF reserves to the EU Emergency 
Trust Fund for Africa.113  
When approving the first payment from the EU budget for the extension of the Facility for Refugees 
in Turkey, the European Parliament expressed its criticism on the method used to establish and extend 
this instrument, which did not involve the EU democratically elected assembly.114 This statement 
reiterates Parliament’s concern that the limitations of the 2014-2020 MFF have led to a multiplication 
of instruments partially outside the EU budget to respond to the refugee crisis, which could have a 
negative impact on accountability and democratic control that needs to be addressed.115 To this effect, 
already in 2015, the Parliament called for the provision of extra funding to the two EU Trust Funds, 
but supported at the same time the identification of a structural solution to make standard EU support 
for humanitarian assistance and development more effective and more readily available.116 
New instruments created as a response to the 2015-2016 crisis, especially the Facility for Refugees 
in Turkey, have been able to leverage additional funding for relevant measures against a backdrop of 
limited resources in the 2014-2020 MFF. According to den Hertog (2016), points to watch in this 
development include the risk of overdependence on third countries in the management of the policy 
areas, changes in the nexus between migration and development in EU external funding, and the need 
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to ensure appropriate auditing and democratic scrutiny of the reconfigured funding landscape.117 
Temprano Arroyo (2018) analyses the achievements and the drawbacks of the new instruments, 
presenting possible improvements for their operations.118  
The budgetary data published by the European Commission do not make it possible to identify the 
actual payment outturns in which planned measures related to the external dimension of asylum, 
migration and borders have resulted. As mentioned in Section 4.1, the European Court of Auditors 
recommended that the European Commission should make available comprehensive reporting on the 
financial resources mobilised in the wake of the migration crisis.119  
However, the information provided by the European Commission on planned funding for the 2015-
2018 period suggests that EU Institutions and Member States paid significant attention to the external 
dimension of asylum, migration and borders. Measures outside the EU have been allocated more 
resources (almost three fifths of the total) than the policy-specific instruments for asylum, migration and 
borders under heading 3 of the EU budget,120 for which Article 80 TFEU explicitly sets the guiding 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between EU Member States. 
The principle enshrined in Article 80 TFEU is predominantly seen as concerning policy-specific 
intra-EU solidarity (see Chapter 2). However, Vanheule et al. (2011) make a distinction between the 
explicit legal relationship between Article 80 TFEU and issues covered by Articles 77-79 TFEU on the 
one hand, and a possible policy or political relationship on the other. Noting the significance of external 
action for the policy areas, they consider that the extent to which the scope of Article 80 TFEU could 
be broadened to asylum, migration and borders issues outside Articles 77-79 TFEU should be 
investigated.121  
In one such analysis, while acknowledging that the letter of Article 80 TFEU concerns intra-EU 
solidarity, Moreno-Lax (2017) builds on a cosmopolitan vision to argue that the solidarity principle 
should be understood as underpinning also the external dimension of the Common European Asylum 
System and relations with third countries, based on the principles of uniformity and coherence of EU 
law.122 Conversely, Farcy et al. (2016) deem the existence of an external dimension of solidarity with 
third countries in Article 80 TFEU difficult to maintain.123  
Looking at the resources deployed by the EU for migration governance outside the Union, Feller 
(2017) considers that, despite the latest initiatives, they remain limited when compared to the 
contribution of remittances to the economies of partner countries, concluding that financial incentives 
to promote third countries´ cooperation on migration management should be further strengthened.124  
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5. National expenditure on asylum management and external border control by EU 
Member States 
An understanding of the total public resources devoted to asylum, migration and borders across the EU 
can help to have an idea of how much the financial implications stemming from the common policies 
are currently shared between the Member States. To this end, the EU policy-specific resources analysed 
in Chapter 3 should be seen in conjunction with relevant expenditure channelled through the budgets of 
national and local authorities. This Chapter looks at the significant challenges that an attempt to identify 
the latter poses, presenting recent developments in the monitoring of these expenditures at national level 
as well as a few tentative estimates from different sources. The focus is on asylum, external border 
controls and visas, i.e. the fields where the EU framework sets more specific obligations for Member 
States as compared to policies concerning legal migration.  
5.1 Challenges and recent developments in the monitoring of relevant expenditure at national level 
While the EU budget provides a good overview of the financial resources pooled together at Union level 
to finance measures relating to the internal dimension of asylum and external border management, a 
picture of the resources devoted to these policy areas at national and local level by Member States is 
much more difficult to obtain. In the case of the management of the EU´s external borders, for example, 
the European Court of Auditors says that most expenditure is incurred by Member States, but adds that 
complete and reliable data on relevant national expenditure are not available.125 The same appears to 
apply to expenditure for asylum management. 
At international level, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
developed the Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG), which organises government 
expenditure data from the System of National Accounts on the basis of the use to which the resources 
are put. COFOG provides three levels of detail. At EU level, Member States have a legal obligation to 
report government expenditure data on the basis of the two first COFOG levels.126 
Under COFOG data, which provide comparability based on a common classification, resources 
allocated to external border and asylum management are likely to be included at least into three main 
categories of expenditure: executive and legislative organs, financial and fiscal affairs, external affairs 
(code 01.1); police services (code 03.1); and social exclusion not elsewhere classified (code 10.7). In its 
2011 manual on compilation of COFOG statistics, the statistical office of the European Union includes 
expenditure for the EU’s external border and Schengen in a non-exhaustive list of difficult cases where 
classification is not obvious.127 In practice, COFOG data do not provide a sufficient level of detail to 
disentangle expenditure for external border and asylum management from the broader categories of 
government expenditure under which they should be reported.  
The complexity of the policy areas at stake contributes to explaining the difficulty of obtaining a 
reliable and comprehensive overview of their financial allocations. Both asylum management and 
external border control (including visa management) have their own specific features, and implementing 
activities may involve various departments and/or agencies within the same Member State. In the case 
of border control, the Ministry of Interior, Border and Coast Guards, and Police forces are usually part 
of the picture, but other authorities that can play a role include the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Immigration Services, and the Ministry of Justice. Likewise, asylum management may 
imply specific competences and tasks for various public authorities such as the Ministry of Interior, 
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Police forces, Immigration Services, the Ministry of Welfare, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of 
Justice, and the Ministry of Education. Most of these authorities are active also in policy areas other 
than asylum or external border control, but their budgetary reporting is not necessarily policy-specific. 
The design of competences may significantly differ from one Member State to the other.128 
In addition, the central level of government may share tasks and related expenditures with other 
levels of government, which creates an additional layer of complexity. In Germany, for example, 
financial statements from the Federal Ministry of Finance present a table that recapitulates federal 
expenditure in the field of asylum. While relevant figures include transfers for immediate needs from 
the federal level on the one hand to the Laender and the municipalities on the other, they do not take 
into account expenditure directly incurred by the latter without the intervention of the Federal budget.129 
Being problematic to determine how much a single Member State invests in asylum management 
and in the control of the EU´s external border, it is a fortiori even more difficult to estimate the total 
investment of the EU and its Member States. Both policy areas are close to core functions of the state 
and their allocations are part of broader categories of government expenditure. Despite the establishment 
of a common EU external border and the development of a Common European Asylum System, their 
implementation has mainly remained at Member State level. In general, it can be argued that the 
financial implications of EU integration through norms in external border control and asylum have not 
been subject to specific monitoring in national budgets. 
However, each time that the interdependent Dublin and Schengen systems have come under pressure, 
the recurrent criticism has resurfaced that their design is intrinsically asymmetric, putting a 
disproportionate burden on some Member States, especially those at the southern and eastern borders of 
the EU.130 The 2015-2016 refugee crisis, when flows of asylum-seekers were significantly higher than 
usual (see Section 3.3) and the pressure was especially concentrated in some entry and destination EU 
Member States,131 has eventually led to an increased monitoring and reporting of relevant expenditure 
at national level.  
This development has mainly taken place in the Member States most affected by the 2015-2016 surge 
in asylum requests from a budgetary perspective, interplaying with a different EU policy area: economic 
governance. In the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) provisions, national authorities 
of the Member States affected by the refugee crisis started to communicate to the European Commission 
the additional budgetary costs triggered by the event, by means of their Stability and Convergence 
Programmes and Draft Budgetary Plans.  
Six Member States (Austria, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia) were eventually 
allowed a temporary deviation from the SGP budgetary requirements, on the basis of the clause for 
unusual events under the preventive arm of the SGP. The budgetary costs taken into account for the 
temporary deviation are the additional ones directly relating to the inflows of asylum-seekers, which 
should not include expenditure items stemming from the broader domain of migration policy.  
A 2016 paper published by the Commission´s Directorate-General for Economic and Financial 
Affairs presents an assessment of the net fiscal costs of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis at national level, 
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based on the information provided by twelve Member States.132 Underlining the uncertainties 
accompanying any macroeconomic assessment of the impact of migration, the document noted that the 
short-term additional fiscal costs affected several Member States, but not all of them, and tended to be 
moderate and unevenly distributed across the EU (between 0.1 % and 0.9 % of gross domestic product, 
GDP). The composition of relevant costs differs between transit and destination countries. The fiscal 
impact may turn positive in the long term, mainly depending on the success of integration policies of 
refugees and migrants into the labour market.133 On this last point, in a recent analysis based on data 
from several EU Member States, Fasani et al. (2018) conclude that the integration into the labour market 
is substantially worse for refugees than for migrants with comparable characteristics, noting that 
potentially counterproductive asylum policies focused on minimising immediate costs can contribute to 
this gap.134 
In conclusion, the information provided in the context of EU economic and fiscal policy coordination 
has to some extent improved the availability of data, giving a snapshot of a subset of the costs relating 
to asylum policies in some Member States. The focus is on the additional costs linked to an unusual 
event rather than on the baseline situation, but confirms that such events can affect Member States 
asymmetrically from a budgetary standpoint. The use of the unusual events clause allowing a temporary 
deviation from SGP budgetary requirements could be seen as an indirect form of solidarity in addition 
to the more direct form of support represented by the mobilisation of additional EU financial resources 
through the flexibility provisions of the MFF (see Section 3.3). Both forms of solidarity share the feature 
that they have been triggered by a situation assessed as exceptional. 
5.2 Some tentative estimates in the field of asylum 
In addition to the exchange of information in the context of the SGP, the attention attracted by the 2015-
2016 refugee crisis in the EU has generated other attempts to estimate its fiscal impact. In early 2016, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) published the outcome of one such exercise, recapitulating the 
estimated short-term fiscal impact in 18 EU Member States.135  
Table 8 reproduces these results,136 expressing them in terms of GNI rather than of GDP to make 
comparability with the EU budget expenditure analysed in Section 3.2 easier. IMF staff, who produced 
the estimates on the basis of information from national authorities and/or other sources, stressed that the 
results were highly tentative. The authors concluded that the EU budget covered only a small part of the 
immediate fiscal cost, which could be sizeable in some Member States. In the case of the ten Member 
States not covered by the estimates, either relevant costs were negligible or information was not 
available. 
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Table 8 – Estimated fiscal cost of asylum-seekers in 18 EU Member States as % of gross national 
income (GNI) 
EU Member State 2014 2015 2016 
Belgium (BE) 0.070% 0.089% 0.110% 
Czech Republic (CZ) 0.000% 0.000% 0.022% 
Denmark (DK) 0.241% 0.468% 0.556% 
Germany (D) 0.079% 0.197% 0.344% 
Ireland (IE) 0.037% 0.058% 0.063% 
Greece (EL) N/A 0.170% N/A 
Spain (ES) 0.006% 0.006% 0.030% 
France (F) 0.049% 0.049% 0.059% 
Croatia (HR) 0.002% 0.092% 0.116% 
Italy (I) 0.171% 0.202% 0.241% 
Cyprus (CY) 0.003% 0.012% 0.012% 
Luxembourg (LU) 0.085% 0.137% 0.136% 
Hungary (HU) 0.000% 0.105% 0.000% 
Netherlands (NL) 0.100% 0.181% 0.235% 
Austria (AT) 0.081% 0.164% 0.315% 
Finland (FI) 0.091% 0.130% 0.369% 
Sweden (SE) 0.292% 0.494% 0.990% 
United Kingdom (UK) 0.016% 0.017% N/A 
Data source: IMF Staff Discussion Note 16/02 (with conversion from GDP into GNI based on Eurostat data), January 2016. 
The IMF estimates suggest that the share of GNI devoted to the policy area varies significantly across 
the EU. In 2014, just before the peak of the refugee crisis, only four Member States (Sweden, Denmark, 
Italy and the Netherlands) were estimated to allocate 0.1 % or more of their GNI to the asylum system.137 
That same year, the payment outturns for the policy-specific resources pooled through the EU budget 
for asylum and migration represented just 0.0014 % of EU GNI (see Figure 2 in Chapter 3). In the two 
subsequent years, the share of GNI allocated to asylum was deemed to increase and exceed 0.1 % in 
various Member States due to the refugee crisis. However, the short-term fiscal impact was unevenly 
distributed across the EU, which is broadly in line with what emerges from the information exchanged 
between Member States and the European Commission in the context of the SGP provisions (see Section 
5.1). 
During the peak of the refugee crisis, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) produced an assessment of the possible impact of large inflows of asylum-seekers and refugees 
on the European economy. The document analysed short-term costs and possible long-term benefits in 
the case of successful integration into the labour market, highlighting the many uncertainties implied in 
such an exercise. Among other points, the OECD estimated that the costs of processing an asylum claim 
and accommodating an asylum-seeker were typically between €8 000 and €12 000 per application in the 
first year, but figures could be significantly lower for fast-track processing.138  
In 2017, a new analysis by the OECD estimated the average cost per application for the first year at 
€10 000, a figure not including possible integration costs that may be sizeable.139 As a matter of 
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138 OECD, How will the refugee surge affect the European economy?, Migration Policy Debate n° 8, November 2015. 
139 OECD, Who bears the cost of integrating refugees?, Migration Policy Debate n° 13, January 2017. 
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comparison, relocation schemes agreed in the current EU programming period allocate a €6 000 lump 
sum contribution per asylum-seeker relocated to the Member States receiving them.140 
Keeping in mind the many caveats that accompany the OECD estimate,141 combining its cost range 
per asylum application (€8 000-€12 000) with EU budgetary information and Eurostat data on asylum 
requests in the Member States can give a highly tentative idea of the estimated budgetary needs for 
asylum requests in the EU and the theoretical contribution of the policy-specific EU funds (the AMIF 
and its predecessors) to their coverage.  
Table 9 – Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and its predecessors: 2014-2016 
theoretical coverage of the estimated budgetary needs for asylum requests in the EU (excluding 
Denmark) 
 2014 2015 2016 
Estimated budgetary needs (€ billion) 4.90 – 7.35 10.42 – 15.62 10.04 – 15.06 
AMIF payment outturns from EU budget (€ billion) 0.18 0.40 0.93 
Estimated AMIF coverage (%) 2.4% – 3.6%  2.6% – 3.9%  6.1% – 9.2%  
Source: Own calculations (based on OECD, Eurostat and European Commission data). 
Table 9 presents such a calculation for the 2014-2016 period, i.e. the peak of the refugee crisis and the 
year immediately preceding it. All data concerning Denmark are excluded, since this Member State does 
not participate in the AMIF and its predecessors. As compared to the initial allocation of €3.1 billion for 
the AMIF over the entire 2014-2020 period, the annual estimated budgetary needs for asylum requests 
across the EU ranged between €4.9-7.35 billion in 2014, and more than doubled in the two subsequent 
years as a consequence of the surge in the number of requests.  
In 2014, the relevant payments from the EU budget to Member States were rather limited and mainly 
came from the AMIF predecessors, due to the transition to the new MFF and the delayed start of the 
AMIF (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3): their theoretical coverage of the estimated budgetary needs for asylum 
requests was between 2.4 % and 3.6 %. In 2015, the theoretical coverage could only slightly increase, 
because the initial uptake of the new AMIF was slow and took place against the backdrop of the refugee 
crisis. The following year, the increase was more significant thanks to the mobilisation of the flexibility 
provisions of the MFF (see Section 3.3), which contributed to bringing the theoretical coverage to 6.1-
9.2 %.  
If the calculation is repeated at Member State level, significant variations are to be observed. Ranging 
from 1 % to more than 100 % depending on the Member State and the year, the theoretical coverage of 
the estimated budgetary needs tends to be higher in Member States with less asylum requests, but can 
improve in some (not all) of the Member States most affected by the refugee crisis, presumably thanks 
to the mobilisation of emergency funding. 
As mentioned, the exercise is highly theoretical and many factors can have an impact on its results, 
starting with the fact that the AMIF and its predecessors do not address only asylum policy, but have 
also broader objectives in the field of migration.  
In addition, the allocations for AMIF national programmes are based on pre-2014 data, in line with 
Member States´ preference for assigning national resources on the basis of a distribution key already 
                                                     
140 See for example: Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection 
for the benefit of Italy and Greece, 22 September 2015. 
141 In a number of occasions (and recently in the context of the discharge procedure for financial year 2016 mentioned in 
Section 4.1), the European Parliament has asked the European Commission to produce estimates of costs per asylum 
application in each EU Member State. However, the European Commission has so far refrained from doing it, pointing to 
the complexity of the exercise, for example in the assessment of relevant overheads.  
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known at the time of the negotiations for the MFF and its implementing regulations (see Section 3.1). 
Therefore, the distribution key is not reactive to evolving trends, which the European Commission can 
seek to address to some extent through emergency funding. In this sense, a study carried out for the 
European Parliament by Darvas et al. (2018) points out that the relationships between the AMIF basic 
allocation and current migration data is not proportionate, providing a number of examples including 
the case of the United Kingdom, which receives the largest share of the basic allocation of the 2014-
2020 AMIF (16.3 %), while its share of asylum requests is significantly lower (3.5 %).142  
The time lag between commitments and payments in the EU budgetary system and possible delays 
in implementation (see Section 3.3) are other elements that might loosen the link between the 
responsibility for the processing of asylum applications and the AMIF theoretical coverage of the related 
budgetary needs. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were of the opinion that the AMIF is 
administratively more burdensome than other EU funds in a survey conducted for the same 2018 
study.143 The European Court of Auditors has identified some weaknesses that can contribute to delays 
in the implementation of migration-related funding instruments.144  
5.3 A complex landscape in the field of external borders 
In the field of public spending on the management of the EU’s external border, there has been little 
improvement in the availability of national data in the wake of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis. The 
European Court of Auditors´ consideration that most expenditure is incurred at national level, but 
complete, reliable and comparable information is missing remains valid. The Court notes that EU 
funding programmes for borders are one element of a complex and much broader landscape.145  
In some cases, the increased monitoring and reporting of expenditure relating to asylum and 
migration policies has included some information provided by Member States on activities relating to 
border management. For example, Italy has provided estimates of the costs of search and rescue 
operations at sea in its budgetary plans.146 In addition, the final report of the Italian Chamber´s Inquiry 
Committee on the country´s asylum system includes considerations concerning return operations of 
illegal migrants. After pointing to the absence of agreements on returns with a number of countries of 
origin, the Committee concluded that the significant costs of return operations, also in terms of human 
resources, are another major obstacle to their implementation, which is only partially mitigated by the 
joint return operations coordinated by Frontex.147  
In its 2017–2021 Convergence Programme of April 2017, Hungary indicated that most of its 
expenditure relating to the refugee crisis went to border control.148 In August 2017, the Member State 
asked for the EU to contribute around €400 million (50 % of the costs) for building fences at the borders 
with EU Member State Croatia and with Serbia, while refusing to implement the relocation scheme of 
asylum-seekers from Greece and Italy that had been adopted to promote fair sharing of responsibility in 
the field of asylum. The Hungarian request, which the European Commission rejected, was announced 
                                                     
142 Z. Darvas, G. Wolff, F. Chiacchio, K. Efstathiou and I. Gonçalves Raposo, EU funds for migration, asylum and integration 
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143 Z. Darvas et al., op. cit, pp. 26-29. 
144 European Court of Auditors, Annual report on the implementation of the budget concerning the financial year 2016, 
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just a few days before the ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that dismissed 
the Hungarian complaint against the relocation scheme.149 A case against Hungary for failure to comply 
with its legal obligations under the relocation scheme is pending before the CJEU.150  
As in the case of asylum management, the bulk of financing for external border management occurs 
at national level. The scattered data available suggests an uneven distribution between EU Member 
States, in which their geographic position may play a role. The external sea and land borders that 
Member States are in charge of managing may significantly differ in terms of length and level of 
complexity. As an indirect acknowledgement of these differences, for example, the Czech Republic was 
not granted an allocation under the Schengen Facility when joining the European Union in 2004, since 
it has no external land and sea borders with non-EU countries.  
The financing of external border management activities taking place mainly at national level reflects 
the original design of the integration process in this domain, which is regulatory (Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs 2018):151 participating Member States develop and comply with relevant common rules, 
remaining responsible for managing their section of the EU´s external border accordingly. 
In 2013, Haake et al. assessed that, since the introduction of the integrated border management 
concept by the European Commission in 2002, progress in establishing financial burden-sharing 
mechanisms had been limited. Characterising external border enforcement as a public good problem, 
they argued that Member States distant from the southern borders of the EU may strategically 
underestimate their real interest in border enforcement, with a view to minimising their contributions to 
enforcement efforts.152 
An increasing attention to sharing of financial responsibility has been observed since then, including 
in the design of relevant EU funding instruments. While the 2007-2013 External Borders Fund (EBF) 
was mainly focused on capacity building,153 the 2014-2020 ISF Borders and Visa introduces specific 
provisions that authorise Member States to use the instrument to finance operating support to the public 
authorities in charge of tasks and services that are recognised as a public service for the EU. The 
operating support is conditional on compliance with the EU acquis on borders and visas.154  
This trend appears to have gained momentum in the wake of the refugee crisis, especially in the 
reinforcement of common tools (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3). In 2016, additional financial resources were 
pooled to accompany the strengthened mandate of Frontex that was transformed into the European 
Border and Coast Guard.155  
6. Possible developments in the post-2020 EU budget 
Analysts agree that migration is already playing a major role in Western politics, which is expected to 
continue in the coming decades.156 According to the Spring 2018 Eurobarometer, immigration is 
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perceived as the leading concern facing the EU and two thirds of respondents are in favour of a common 
European policy on migration.157 The awareness of the transnational dimension of migration and asylum 
phenomena is confirmed by the intergovernmental negotiations on the Global Compact for Migration 
and the Global Compact on Refugees carried out under the auspices of United Nations’ organisations.  
The need to ensure appropriate resources for measures related to asylum, migration and external borders 
at EU level will not subside, since these policies are essential elements of the broader migration 
framework. This Chapter shows how the debate on the financing of relevant measures has developed in 
the run-up to the proposals for the post-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). An overview of 
the actual proposals that the European Commission put forward in May 2018 is followed by an analysis 
of the first reactions that these proposals have triggered.  
6.1 Asylum, migration and borders in the debate leading to the proposals for the new MFF  
The policy areas of asylum, migration and borders have featured in the debate on the new MFF more 
prominently than in past occasions from very early on. In 2014, the European Parliament, the Council 
and the European Commission already kick-started the reflection on the post-2020 EU budget, by 
creating an interinstitutional High-Level Group tasked with a review of the EU´s financing system. The 
works of the High-Level Group chaired by Professor Mario Monti took place against the backdrop of 
the significant challenges to which the current MFF has been confronted since its first years of existence, 
including as a consequence of the migration and refugee crisis (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3).  
Presented in January 2017, the final report of the High-Level Group noted that recent events had 
triggered the gradual recognition of external border management as an EU public good and shown the 
limitations of the MFF in addressing budgetary needs stemming from responsibilities in the field of 
migration policy. Along these lines, one recommendation was that the expenditure side of the EU budget 
should increase its focus on policy areas relating to EU public goods and European added value, where 
joint action at Union level is deemed not only relevant but indispensable.158  
The same year, the discussion gained further momentum as part of the broader debate on the future 
of the EU that the European Commission initiated with a White Paper in March 2017.159 In the context 
of this process, the Commission published a reflection paper on the future of EU finances,160 taking into 
account the conclusions and the recommendations of the High-Level Group chaired by Professor Monti. 
All the key principles identified by the European Commission as the basis of any possible reform of 
the EU budget are relevant to the policy areas of asylum, migration and borders and to the challenges 
that they have been facing in the current MFF. In particular, the principles are: 1) concentrating resources 
on the policy areas with the highest EU added value, selected through criteria such as Treaty objectives 
and obligations, and public goods with a European dimension; 2) continuing simplification efforts with 
a view to further streamlining implementation; 3) keeping the creation of tools outside the EU budget 
to a minimum so as to ensure democratic accountability and transparency; and 4) reinforcing the 
flexibility provisions with a view to increasing the capacity to address unexpected events. On this basis, 
the European Commission concludes that migration and security should get higher resources and/or 
shares of the EU budget in four out of the five scenarios envisaged for the future of the EU.161 
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The European Court of Auditors endorsed the guiding principles identified by the Commission for the 
reform of the EU budget, formulating six proposals to increase the efficiency and transparency of EU 
finances, which included the development and application of a robust concept of EU added value.162  
At the beginning of 2018, the European Commission released its contribution to the first informal 
discussion between EU Heads of State and Governments on the priorities for the 2021-2027 MFF. The 
Commission reiterated that its forthcoming proposals would be based on the concept of European added 
value and EU public goods, calling for a better alignment of the budgetary framework with political 
priorities. The contribution included external border control and management of migration flows among 
the policy areas to be considered in this respect.  
In addition, the reinforcement of special instruments and flexibility provisions was deemed 
instrumental in addressing challenges such as migration. With regard to the expected shortfall in EU 
resources due to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Union, the intention was to finance 
new priorities partly through cuts in existing instruments and partly by mobilising new resources.163 
Following the informal summit of 23 February 2018, European Council President Donald Tusk 
announced that EU leaders were willing to increase EU spending on a number of political priorities, 
which included security and stemming illegal immigration.164 European Parliament President Antonio 
Tajani called for a reinforced EU budget to address citizens´ priorities, singling out external border 
control and management of migration flows among others.165  
According to press sources, disagreements on matters relating to these sensitive policy areas also 
emerged. For example, eastern Member States as well as some of Germany’s traditional allies in MFF 
negotiations such as Austria and Luxembourg were reported to have opposed German proposals that 
cohesion funding be in part linked to the number of refugees in each Member State, with a view to 
supporting their integration.166  
Outlining his country’s vision at the end of the February summit, French President Emmanuel 
Macron was in favour of an expansionary EU budget that adequately reflects and finances new EU 
priorities including border control.167 In a speech at the European Parliament on 17 April 2018, he also 
supported the idea of an EU programme funding local communities that host and integrate refugees. The 
European Commission has consulted all Member States in the preparation of its proposals. 
In its input to the debate, the European Parliament said that the current MFF is tackling asylum and 
refugee policy in a crisis-management mode, noting that significant contributions to this effect were 
provided by many of the flexibility provisions that Parliament itself had promoted and defended in the 
negotiations for the 2014-2020 MFF. While supporting a further reinforcement of such provisions in the 
next programming period, the European Parliament called for the approach to asylum and migration in 
the MFF to evolve from crisis management to a permanent and common EU policy, endowed with 
appropriate resources for relevant measures and decentralised agencies. In addition, complementarity 
with other EU funding instruments for internal and external policies should be enhanced. Likewise, 
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according to the resolution, the EU should assume its responsibility in strengthening external border 
protection, looking at both the internal and the external dimensions of the policy areas.168 
6.2 Proposals for the 2021-2027 period 
The attention to asylum, migration and borders that characterised the preparation of the proposals for 
the 2021-2027 MFF has resulted into a number of provisions that seek to address challenges emerged 
in recent years. Envisaged measures, which are part of the draft MFF Regulation and of the proposals 
for its implementing programmes, include an increase in relevant financial allocations, the strengthening 
of flexibility provisions, a stronger complementarity with other EU funding instruments and attempts to 
simplify the implementation framework of relevant measures. 
On 2 May 2018, the European Commission proposed the creation of a policy-specific heading 
´Migration and border management´ (heading 4) within the 2021-2027 MFF, confirming the growing 
relevance that these policies have acquired at EU level over the last years.  
The new heading 4 of the MFF would include the decentralised EU agencies active in the policy 
areas and the successors of the current funding programmes to be named Asylum and Migration Fund 
(AMF)169 and Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF).170 According to the European Commission, 
in the new programming period allocations for these categories of expenditure would be 2.6 times higher 
(or +160 %) when compared to the 2014-2020 MFF without the United Kingdom (in current prices).171 
When looking at the policy areas individually, Figure 6 shows that both are projected to grow, but the 
increase is proportionally more significant for border management (+292 %) than for asylum and 
migration (+59 %). 
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Figure 6 – Migration and borders allocations: Commission proposal for 2021-2027 as compared 
to 2014-2020 resources except United Kingdom (€ million, current prices) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on European Commission data.  
Under the MFF proposal, the share of the EU budget allocated to the internal dimension of asylum, 
migration and borders is 2.55 % (or 2.73 % when including the margin left available for the heading), 
which is well above the level reached in 2016 (1.4 %) in the wake of the refugee crisis. Likewise, the 
proposed resources mark an increase in the 
share of EU GNI pooled together by 
Member States for the policy areas, which 
would reach 0.029 % (or 0.030 % when 
including the margin of the heading). This 
percentage is more than double the level 
reached in 2016 (see Figure 7), but still 
well below the share of its GNI that the US 
spends on borders, migration and asylum 
(see Section 3.2).172  
Table 10 shows that, in the Commission 
proposal, heading 4 would allocate 61 % of 
its €30.8 billion resources (2018 prices)173 
to border management and 32 % to 
migration, leaving the remainder as a 
margin for unforeseen events. In the final 
year of the programming period, the 
allocations of the heading would be 60 % 
higher than in 2021 (in constant prices, to 
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give a better idea of real increases, by eliminating the impact of estimated inflation). The relative 
increase in the course of the programming period would again be more pronounced for border 
management (+72 %) than for asylum and migration (+54 %).  
Table 10 – Composition of heading 4 ´Migration and Border Management´ in the European 
Commission proposal for the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (commitments in 
€ million and 2018 prices) 
 2021-2027 
allocations 
As % of 
heading 4 
2027 resources 
as compared to 
2021 resources 
Migration 9 972 32 % + 54 % 
- Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) 9 205 30 % + 61 % 
- Decentralised agencies 770 2 % 0 % 
Border management 18 824 61 % + 72 % 
- Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF) 8 237 27 % + 67 % 
- Decentralised agencies 10 587 34 % + 75 % 
Margin 2 033 7 % 0 % 
Total heading 4 30 829 100 % + 60 % 
Source: Own calculations (based on COM (2018) 321, 2 May 2018, p. 30) 
The difference in the allocation of resources between the two main categories of expenditure (funding 
programmes and decentralised agencies) already observed in the two policy areas (see Section 3.2) 
would be reinforced, confirming deeper development of common tools in the field of external border 
control. In this policy area, 56 % of the resources would go to decentralised agencies, which reflects the 
Commission´s intention to further strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard Agency beyond its 
2016 reform174 and to develop a standing corps of 10 000 border guards by 2027. In addition, the funding 
programme IBMF includes allocations for development, maintenance and interoperability of common 
IT systems.  
Conversely, in the field of migration, the new funding programme AMF would get 92 % of the 
allocations, and the remaining 8 % would finance decentralised agencies. In particular, the figures 
suggest that the European Commission does not plan any significant reinforcement of EASO´s role 
beyond the extension of the agency´s mandate proposed in May 2016 and still being debated in the 
Council and the European Parliament in July 2018.175 The annual amount for decentralised agencies in 
the field of migration is projected to remain stable at €110 million (2018 prices) over the entire 2021-
2027 period, whereas the resources for decentralised agencies in the area of borders would increase each 
year with funding in 2027 being 75 % higher than in 2021 (see Table 10). 
Both the draft MFF Regulation and the related sectoral proposals include new elements as compared 
to the current programming period. For the first time, the policy-specific funds for external borders, 
asylum and migration would have common financial rules176 with the European Structural and 
Investment Funds (ESIF) under cohesion policy.177 This development could contribute to improving 
their complementarity, which is currently hindered (e.g. in the case of the AMIF and the ESF) by the 
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coexistence of two sets of different rules (see Section 4.1). Improving complementarity of the various 
funding instruments is all the more important, since the European Commission proposes that the AMF 
focus on short-term needs, while the medium- and long-term needs in the field of integration of third-
country nationals should be addressed by the relevant ESIFs, in particular the new European Social Fund 
and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The proposal for the European Social Fund 
Plus (ESF+) includes the promotion of the socio-economic integration of third-country nationals and 
marginalised communities among its eleven specific objectives.178 
To reflect this strengthened role of ESIF in the field of integration, the distribution of financial 
allocations between Member States would be determined not only on the basis of gross domestic product 
(GDP),179 but also on net migration from outside the EU to each Member State between 2013 and 2016, 
among other factors.180  
With regard to the new generation of policy-specific funds, the European Commission seeks to 
simplify a number of implementing, audit and control provisions, taking into account the interim 
evaluations of the AMIF and the ISF Borders and Visa. In addition, this objective appears to be in line 
with observations of the European Court of Auditors, according to which a number of weaknesses in 
the 2014-2020 AMIF and ISF have led to delays in their implementation.181  
Another objective that the interim evaluations have fed into the proposals for the 2021-2027 funding 
programmes is an increased flexibility of the mechanisms to allocate resources with a view to improving 
the ability to address emerging needs. To this end, as compared to their predecessors, both the new AMF 
and the IBMF would have a significant share of their resources that is not geographically pre-allocated, 
but would periodically be assigned to specific objectives on the basis of developments and emerging 
needs.182 
In addition, the attempt to increase the EU budget´s capacity to respond to unexpected and evolving 
challenges is more generally addressed at MFF level. The proposed Regulation for the 2021-2027 
programming period reinforces the possibilities of shifting resources within the MFF and increases the 
allocations of special instruments that have proved crucial in the wake of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis. 
Among other modifications, the maximum annual allocation of the Emergency Aid Reserve would be 
increased to €600 million (2018 prices) and its scope would be extended to include crises on the territory 
of the European Union, thus assuming the role played in the current period by the temporary instrument 
for emergency support within the EU introduced in 2016 (see Section 3.3). The draft MFF Regulation 
specifically mentions situations of particular pressure resulting from migratory flows at the Union's 
external borders among the reasons for mobilising the Emergency Aid Reserve.183  
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6.3 Initial reactions and some points to watch during the negotiations 
In May 2018, the European Parliament criticised the overall level of resources proposed by the European 
Commission for the 2021-2027 MFF, when taking into account the needs stemming from new political 
priorities and emerging challenges. Parliament called for additional funding to be secured in a number 
of policy areas, which include migration, security and external relations.184 
At its meeting of 28 June 2018, the European Council made direct and indirect references to the 
2021-2027 MFF in its conclusions on migration. In particular, the European Council stressed that the 
next framework should include flexible and fast instruments to fight illegal migration, adding that EU 
funds for asylum, migration and borders should have significant components devoted to the external 
dimension of migration management.  
In addition, the European Council expressed its favourable view on the further strengthening of the 
financial resources and mandate of Frontex proposed by the Commission, with a view to increasing the 
Agency´s support to Member States in the protection of the EU´s external borders as well as in return 
operations.185  
On the same topic, shortly after Austria assumed the six-month rotating Presidency of the Council in 
July 2018, Chancellor Kurz called for the expansion of Frontex from 1 300 to 10 000 staff to happen 
immediately in 2020 rather than being implemented gradually by 2027, as planned in the initial 
Commission proposal. Austria expressed its intention to act as an honest broker of EU compromises for 
the topics being considered by the Council during its rotating Presidency, including the 2021-2027 MFF. 
In this respect, the proposal to shift ESIF resources, increasing allocations for Member States most 
affected by the 2015-2016 refugee crisis, is reported to encounter the opposition of Poland and other 
Member States.186  
The European Court of Auditors (ECA) considered that the European Commission prepared its MFF 
proposals on the basis of a sound procedure, which included a spending review providing strong 
arguments for simplification and useful elements to improve the efficiency of EU funding instruments. 
Analysing whether the European Commission had addressed a series of proposals put forward by the 
Court in the context of the debate on the future of EU finances (see Section 6.1), the ECA concluded 
that the MFF proposal significantly improved the EU budget´s capacity to respond to evolving needs. 
However, progress was deemed more nuanced in other fields, such as the development and application 
of a robust concept of EU value added.187  
Commenting on the Commission proposals for the 2021-2027 MFF, various analysts have differing 
views on their degree of innovativeness, but in general agree that the level of funding proposed for the 
new heading ´Migration and border management´ would represent a significant increase. 
In particular, Claeys and Darvas (2018) consider the funding proposals for a number of EU common 
goods among the positive elements of the package, specifically mentioning the huge increase in the 
allocations for border control and the (more limited) increase in the resources for migration 
management. Conversely, the authors deem the proposed allocations for external policies too timid, 
suggesting that this might have a negative impact on the external dimension of migration 
management.188  
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While arguing that the MFF proposal is much in continuity with the current programming period, 
Nuñéz Ferrer and Gros (2018) highlight the creation of a specific heading for migration and border 
control and its increased funding among its most significant innovations.189  
Haas, Rubio and Schneemelcher (2018), who assess the planned allocations of resources to new 
priorities as relatively ambitious, likewise note the significant increase proposed for the policies 
currently included in heading 3 ´Security and Citizenship´.190 
In the context of the expected withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU, the MFF 
proposals put forward by the European Commission include cuts in the allocations for some policy areas 
in both nominal and real terms. Against this background, the proposed increase in the resources for 
migration and borders confirms that these policy areas attracted more attention and consideration than 
in the run-up to previous MFF proposals.  
At the same time, it should be noted that the figures in the draft MFF Regulation for 2021-2027 are 
the Commission input to the process. Past MFF negotiations show that, in relative terms, Member States 
in the European Council have regularly cut proposed allocations for activities in the fields of justice and 
home affairs more drastically than the overall framework (see Section 3.1). It remains to be seen whether 
higher focus on these policy areas will persist in a negotiation phase that may be different from those 
that characterised the preparation of past MFFs. 
Analysts consider that the expected withdrawal of the UK from the EU might alter the traditional 
dynamics and coalitions of Member States in MFF negotiations, for example among net contributors to 
the EU budget.191 If the balance between and within groups of Member States sharing similar objectives 
varies, this development may have an impact on the European Council´s approach to the various 
headings of the MFF, including the one for migration and border management.  
Another element to be watched in the negotiations for the 2021-2027 MFF is the distribution of 
resources between the individual components of the heading. For example, the resources proposed by 
the Commission for the Asylum and Migration Fund increase as compared to its predecessor, but 
proportionally less than the other components of the heading. The European Commission proposed that 
the Fund be allocated €9.2 billion (2018 prices) for the 2021-2027 period. Despite the increase, this 
amount to be implemented over seven years across the EU still represents just around two thirds of what 
Germany currently spends, at federal level only, for the internal dimension of asylum management in a 
single year.192 If the outcome of the negotiations confirms the proposed level of resources, this basic 
comparison suggests that expenditure in the policy area would predominantly remain at national level, 
with the EU budget designed to provide a complementary contribution.  
Finally, while the MFF negotiations will determine the level of resources for the heading ´Migration 
and Border Management´, they should not be seen in isolation from the negotiations on the sectoral 
Funds that are to implement relevant activities. The AMF and the IBMF include the rules that determine 
how the resources agreed for asylum, migration and borders are distributed between the Member States. 
The parameters eventually retained to this effect and their capacity to reflect evolving needs will have 
an impact on the actual contribution that financial resources from the EU budget can make to the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility enshrined in Article 80 TFEU. 
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7. Conclusions 
Against the background of the common policies on borders, asylum and migration promoted by EU 
Member States over the last decades, this paper has gathered and analysed data to investigate the role of 
budgetary resources in their gradual development and in the provision of the related common goods.  
Traditionally, policy-specific financial resources pooled by Member States for the internal dimension 
of these policy areas have represented a minor share of the EU budget and of EU GNI. Unlike other 
major EU projects such as the completion of the single market in the 1990s and enlargement in the 
2000s, the creation of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice to which these policies pertain has not 
seen a significant investment of common financial resources through the EU budget, despite support in 
such a development from the European Parliament and the European Commission. This difference is 
explained on the one hand by institutional challenges proper to the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, and on the other by specific features of the EU budgetary system. 
Budgetary data show that the 2015-2016 refugee crisis has triggered a change of pace in pooling of 
resources and financial solidarity at EU level, reflecting increased efforts to address jointly the 
responsibilities related to asylum, migration and borders, and the common goods that they involve. This 
financial solidarity can be seen as a common insurance mechanism for EU Member States, when 
considering that Member States receiving relevant allocations also contribute to funding them through 
the standard financing system of the EU budget.  
However, only a vast resort to the flexibility provisions of the 2014-2020 MFF made the recent 
increase in EU financial resources for asylum, migration and borders possible. Analysing the latest 
developments in the field of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), Tsourdi (2017) concludes 
that the solidarity principle remains emergency-driven and fair sharing of responsibility is not 
structurally embedded in the system contrary to what Article 80 TFEU would require.193  
Data on public spending on asylum, migration and borders at national level are scattered, incomplete 
and difficult to compare. However, available estimates and information tend to confirm that this 
expenditure is unevenly distributed across the EU, for example in terms of the share of their GNI that 
each Member State devotes to the policy areas. Geographic position and the Dublin rule assigning the 
responsibility for asylum claims mainly to the first country of entry in the EU are factors that may play 
a role in this imbalance.  
Despite the recent increases, the contribution of the EU budget is still limited as compared to systems 
such as the US where these policy areas are much more centralised. In the EU, most expenditure for 
asylum, migration and borders appears to be covered by the budgets of national (as well as regional and 
local) authorities. In addition, new developments such as the 2015-2016 refugee crisis have the potential 
to affect some Member States much more significantly than others, acting as a sort of an asymmetric 
shock.  
Pooling of financial resources at EU level to match the obligations stemming from the EU´s common 
policies on asylum, migration an external border control is a necessary element of any effort to ensure 
an effective provision of the common goods related to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice through 
a fair sharing of responsibility between Member States. However, ´sharing money´ alone will not be 
sufficient to achieve these objectives, but needs to be accompanied by a broader reflection and 
agreement on the responsibility to be shared and a corresponding design of the common policies. In this 
sense, the European Parliament has repeatedly called for a holistic EU approach to migration.194 In June 
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2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that the absence of a common response to migration 
challenges could threaten the foundations of the EU, starting with free movement.195  
At the same time, an agreement on the responsibility to be shared could include better monitoring 
and reporting of related financial resources, thus contributing to improving the forecasting of the overall 
investments needed in the policy areas. 
The 2016 transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coast Guard is an example of the 
fact that measures taken by EU Institutions in the wake of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis have tried to 
take into account the different elements at stake, by coupling a reinforcement of the Agency´s mandate 
with the mobilisation of additional funding despite the limited resources available in the 2014-2020 
MFF.  
Nevertheless, analysts consider that, while the new configuration of Frontex is an improvement, it 
does not yet represent a common and automatic mechanism to fairly share responsibility concerning EU 
external border management between Member States.196 This interpretation appears to be indirectly 
confirmed by the European Commission´s estimates of the financial resources that an upgraded Agency 
would imply as compared to the maximum use of the Agency in its current configuration over the 2021-
2027 period. Providing support for a fully integrated EU border management system would require an 
increase in the resources allocated to Frontex estimated between +150 % and +213 %, while only a 
+1775 % increase would be able to ensure a full EU border management system comparable to those of 
the US or of Canada.197 
Similar considerations are made in the field of asylum management, where the development of 
common EU structures and tools is less advanced than in external border control (see Section 3.2), and 
the negotiations on a possible reinforcement of EASO are still ongoing. Deeming the current CEAS to 
imply a systemic solidarity gap in the distribution of related responsibilities between EU Member States, 
Carrera and Lannoo (2018) argue that intra-EU solidarity for asylum management and search and rescue 
operations should be stepped up significantly and embedded in the system. In their view, this 
development would involve both the institutional design of the policy areas (through a reinforced 
European asylum agency and a fully operational mandate for search and rescue operations given to 
Frontex, which could eventually lead to the creation of a single European Border and Asylum Service), 
and the related increase in the financial resources provided by the EU budget.198  
The European Commission proposals for the 2021-2027 MFF seek to address the challenges emerged 
in recent years, by enhancing the allocations for the internal dimension of the policy areas and in 
particular for border control. If accepted as they stand, relevant resources would represent 0.03 % of EU 
GNI, suggesting that most of the expenditure will continue to occur at national level despite an increase 
in the pooling of resources at EU level. 
Reinforcing the EU budget´s contribution to fair sharing of responsibility in asylum, migration and 
borders will depend not only on the overall level of resources assigned to the policy areas, but also on 
how these resources are distributed and spent. Enhancement of common EU structures and tools such 
as relevant EU agencies and IT systems goes in the direction of higher sharing of responsibility.  
As regards funding programmes, since resources would remain rather limited in absolute terms as 
compared to the variety of measures covered, the link between their distribution between Member States 
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and responsibilities stemming directly from the configuration of the common EU policies could be 
strengthened. In this respect, the distribution formula could give a significant weight to key parameters 
and/or elements that directly reflect those responsibilities.  
For example, in the case of the Asylum and Migration Fund, which the European Commission 
intends to focus on short-term needs, a major role could be played by the number of asylum applications 
that each Member State deals with, since it is the Dublin Regulation that assigns this responsibility to a 
given Member State.199 A lump sum per request to be tackled could be envisaged as a contribution to 
related activities (e.g. processing of requests, accommodation, return operations in the case of a negative 
decision, etc.). In the current programming period, a lump sum contribution has been included in 
relocation schemes within the EU under which Member States have received €6 000 per person 
relocated to their territory.200  
If the ESF+ is to address longer-term needs as proposed by the European Commission, the allocation 
of resources for its specific objective of integration of third-country nationals could take into account a 
different parameter, i.e. the number of positive decisions granting international protection taken by each 
Member State, looking at this element as the follow-up phase of the responsibility stemming from the 
CEAS in the case of a positive decision.  
With regard to the instrument for financial support for border management and visa, Annex I of the 
proposed Regulation for 2021-2027 includes distribution keys that take into account both structural 
elements (length of external sea and land borders, number of airports and of consular offices) and the 
related workload, attributing different weighting to the various components. The proposed calculation 
also resorts to the expertise of Frontex, which is to provide assessments of the average level of threat of 
each border section.201 
Since the MFF and its implementing programmes are agreed for a multiannual period (usually of 
seven years), other moves supporting fair sharing of responsibility could come from reducing the share 
of resources geographically allocated before the start of the programming period and from reinforcing 
flexibility provisions. Such developments could increase the EU´s capacity to assign the resources where 
they are most needed, based on regular monitoring of evolving needs to be translated into actual 
budgetary allocations. A number of provisions of the proposals for the 2021-2027 MFF seek to go in 
this direction.  
In addition, ensuring a smoother transition between programming periods than it has traditionally 
been the case for policy-specific EU expenditure on asylum, migration and borders could prevent the 
EU budget´s contribution to fair sharing of responsibility from being potentially under pressure at the 
start of a new MFF. Proposals for simplification and, again, increased flexibility may help to this effect. 
In conclusion, the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility between Member States is 
to govern the common EU policies for asylum, migration and borders according to Article 80 TFEU. 
Any design of such policies should consider and incorporate the contribution that the EU budget can 
make to fully translating this principle into practice, with a view to ensuring an appropriate level of 
provisions of the EU common goods that have emerged in these policy areas following the removal of 
internal borders across most of the European Union. 
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